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THE IRREPRESSIBLE MYTH OF KLEIN
Howard M. Wasserman*

I. INTRODUCTION
Law is steeped in myth. 1 So, too, are many judicial decisions in the
legal canon. 2
One such mythical decision is United States v. Klein. 3 In that
Reconstruction-era decision, the Supreme Court invalidated a
congressional attempt to dictate the judicial and evidentiary effect of
presidential pardons in Court of Claims actions brought by Southern
property owners to recover proceeds on property confiscated by Union
agents during the Civil War. 4 Klein is canonical as much for its
purported indeterminacy as for its principles of separation of powers. 5
* Associate Professor of Law, FIU College of Law. Various versions of this paper were
presented at faculty workshops at Florida State University College of Law in February 2010, FIU
College of Law and Rutgers School of Law–Camden in March 2009, and at PrawfsFest! in November
2008; thanks to all participants for their comments and suggestions. Special thanks to Michael Allen,
William Araiza, Elizabeth Foley, Todd Pettys, Martin Redish, Michael Solimine, Allan Stein, Amanda
Tyler, William Van Alstyne, Steve Vladeck, and Gordon Young for comments and suggestions on
research and early drafts.
1. See, e.g., Edward K. Cheng, The Myth of the Generalist Judge, 61 STAN. L. REV. 519 (2008);
Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice Pleading, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 987 (2003); Steven G. Gey,
The Myth of State Sovereignty, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 1601 (2002); Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90
HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1977); Todd E. Pettys, The Myth of the Written Constitution, 84 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 991 (2009); see also Frederic M. Bloom, Jurisdiction’s Noble Lie, 61 STAN. L. REV. 971, 972
(2009) [hereinafter Bloom, Noble Lie].
2. Scholars have described the “myth” of three other canonical cases: Erie R.R. Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), and Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986). See John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693
(1974); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Irrepressible Myth of Marbury, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2706 (2003)
[hereinafter Paulsen, Myth]; Adam N. Steinman, The Irrepressible Myth of Celotex: Reconsidering
Summary Judgment Burdens on the Twenty-fifth Anniversary of the Trilogy, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
81 (2006).
3. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871).
4. Id. at 145–47. See Evan Caminker, Schiavo and Klein, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 529, 571–72
(2005); Edward A. Hartnett, Congress Clears its Throat, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 553, 570–73 (2005);
Martin H. Redish & Christopher R. Pudelski, Legislative Deception, Separation of Powers, and the
Democratic Process: Harnessing the Political Theory of United States v. Klein, 100 NW. U. L. REV.
437, 438 (2006); Lawrence G. Sager, Klein’s First Principle, 86 GEO. L.J. 2525, 2525–26 (1998);
Gordon G. Young, Congressional Regulations of Federal Courts’ Jurisdiction and Processes: United
States v. Klein Revisited, 1981 WIS. L. REV. 1189, 1192–94.
5. See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 218 (1995) (expressing uncertainty as to
the “precise scope of Klein”); Nat’l Coalition to Save Our Mall v. Norton, 269 F.3d 1092, 1096 (D.C.
Cir. 2001) (“Klein’s exact meaning is far from clear.”); see also Sager, supra note 4, at 2525 (labeling
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The case is of “substantial significance,” although “no one is exactly
sure how or why.” 6
In fact, Klein is more relevant today than it has been in its 140-year
history. 7 In the past decade, Congress has considered, and occasionally
enacted, laws that have at least triggered Klein-based separation of
powers objections or arguments. These laws broadly fall in three areas:
(1) tort reform efforts to prohibit particular classes of state-law tort
claims; 8 (2) attempts to control so-called judicial activism, such as by
overriding state court decisions on controversial issues 9 or prohibiting
federal-court use of foreign and international law in constitutional
interpretation; 10 and (3) laws enacted as part of the Global War on
Terror, such as granting retroactive immunity to telecommunications
providers who assisted the Bush Administration in arguably unlawful
domestic wiretap operations 11 or establishing adjudicative mechanisms
for dealing with terror detainees. 12 All of these laws, particularly those
dealing with the War on Terror, return Klein and the limits it purportedly
imposes on Congress and the executive to the center of the constitutional
Klein as “deeply puzzling”).
6. Redish & Pudelski, supra note 4, at 437.
7. Two things demonstrate Klein’s rebirth in doctrinal prominence. First, one Federal Courts
casebook now gives Klein and its subsequent evolution substantial play. See PETER W. LOW ET AL.,
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW OF FEDERAL–STATE RELATIONS 103–13 (6th ed. Supp. 2009). Other
casebooks continue to give the case note status. See, e.g., DONALD L. DOERNBERG ET AL., FEDERAL
COURTS, FEDERALISM AND SEPARATION OF POWERS: CASES AND MATERIALS (4th ed. 2008); RICHARD
H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (6th
ed. 2009); MARTIN H. REDISH & SUZANNA SHERRY, FEDERAL COURTS: CASES, COMMENTS, AND
QUESTIONS (6th ed. 2007). Second, the new “Federal Courts Stories” book, telling the underlying
stories of significant Federal Courts cases, includes a chapter on Klein. Amanda L. Tyler, The Story of
Klein: The Scope of Congress’ Authority to Shape the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, in FEDERAL
COURTS STORIES (Vicki C. Jackson & Judith Resnik eds., 2009).
8. See, e.g., Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, Pub. L. No. 109-92, 119 Stat. 2095
(2005); City of New York v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 524 F.3d 384, 395–96 (2d Cir. 2008); Personal
Responsibility in Food Consumption Act of 2005, H.R. 554, 109th Cong. (as passed in the House of
Representatives); see also WILLIAM HALTOM & MICHAEL MCCANN, DISTORTING THE LAW: POLITICS,
MEDIA, AND THE LITIGATION CRISIS 228 (2004) (coining term “third world of torts” to describe classaction litigation to recover for mass-tort conduct causing latent injuries, labeling it a “harbinger of future
development of social policy torts involving gun manufacturers [and] fast food producers”). See infra
notes 269–276 and accompanying text.
9. See An Act for the Relief of Parents of Theresa Marie Schiavo, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat.
25 (2005).
10. See Constitution Restoration Act of 2005, S.520, 109th Cong. § 201 (as introduced in the
Senate) (prohibiting federal courts from considering foreign and international law in interpreting U.S.
Constitution). See infra notes 182–200 and accompanying text.
11. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110261, § 802, 122 Stat. 2436 (codified at 50 U.S.C.A. § 1885a (West 2010)); In re Nat’l Sec. Agency
Telecomms. Records Litig., 633 F. Supp. 2d 949, 956–57 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (upholding immunity
provision as against Klein challenge).
12. See Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600.
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debate. 13
The problem is that Klein is a myth. Actually, Klein is two related
myths. The first is the myth of meaninglessness—that Klein does not
obviously stand for anything because no one knows what the case means
or says. To be sure, the opinion by Chief Justice Chase is “opaque,”
“deeply puzzling,” “disjointed,” “delphic,” “generally difficult to
follow,” and contains broad language and exaggerated rhetorical
flourishes, with statements of principles that cannot literally be true and
often are dead wrong. 14
That perceived opacity lends Klein
indeterminacy, an all-things-to-all-people quality. 15 The result is a “cult
of Klein,” a reverence that prompts parties and scholars to seize on the
perceived lack of clarity to argue for broad Klein-derived limits on
congressional control over federal law and courts. 16 If Klein has no
discernible meaning, there is at least a plausible argument that it applies
to any objectionable situation.
This leads to the second, more fundamental myth of vigor—the false
belief that Klein is strong precedent imposing genuine, unique
limitations that an overreaching Congress realistically might transgress
and that a court might wield to invalidate congressional action.
Consider that in almost 140 years, the only case to strike down a law
explicitly on Klein grounds was Klein itself; every Klein-based
challenge to federal legislation has, quite appropriately, failed. 17 Klein
13. I consider the effect of Klein on War on Terror legislation in the follow-up to this Article.
See Howard M. Wasserman, Constitutional Pathology, the War on Terror, and United States v. Klein, 5
J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y (forthcoming 2011).
14. See William D. Araiza, The Trouble with Robertson: Equal Protection, the Separation of
Powers, and the Line Between Statutory Amendment and Statutory Interpretation, 48 CATH. U. L. REV.
1055, 1074 (1999); Frederic M. Bloom, Unconstitutional Courses, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1679, 1718 (2005)
[hereinafter Bloom, Unconstitutional Courses]; Hartnett, supra note 4, at 572; Barry Friedman, The
History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part II: Reconstruction’s Political Court, 91 GEO. L.J. 1,
34 (2002) (“Klein is sufficiently impenetrable that calling it opaque is a compliment”); Daniel J.
Meltzer, Congress, Courts, and Constitutional Remedies, 86 GEO. L.J. 2537, 2549 (1998) (“Much that it
said in the opinion is exaggerated if not dead wrong . . . .”); Sager, supra note 4, at 2525 (arguing that,
while not exactly Fermat’s Last Theorem, Klein is “deeply puzzling”); Young, supra note 4, at 1193,
1195 (describing opinion as “confusing” and criticizing “excessively broad and ambiguous statements”
in majority opinion); id. at 1212 (labeling opinion “disjointed, ambiguous, and generally difficult to
follow”).
15. See Young, supra note 4, at 1195.
16. Id.
17. See, e.g., Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 218 (1995); Robertson v. Seattle
Audubon Soc’y, 503 U.S. 429, 439–41 (1992); Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 565 F. 3d 1126, 1139 (9th Cir.
2009); City of New York v. Beretta Corp. U.S.A., 524 F.3d 384, 396 (2d Cir. 2008); Ecology Ctr. v.
Castaneda, 426 F.3d 1144, 1148 (9th Cir. 2005); Nat’l Coalition to Save Our Mall v. Norton, 269 F.3d
1092, 1096 (D.C. Cir. 2001); In re Nat’l Sec. Agency Telecomms. Records Litig, 633 F. Supp. 2d 949,
961–64 (N.D. Cal. 2009); see also Caminker, supra note 4, at 542 (stating that courts “work very hard to
avoid Klein”); Sager, supra note 4, at 2525 (“Klein typically is invoked as good law but not applicable to
the case before the Court . . . .”).
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arguments rarely gain traction with anyone other than entrepreneurial
litigants, scholars, and the occasional stray judge. 18
In speaking of the myth of Klein, we must understand the paradoxical
meanings of “myth” in law. Most commonly, myth is a synonym for
fiction, describing a false idea or premise. 19 But myth also describes a
story or belief that, although false in some respects, nevertheless is
accepted and celebrated in the legal community because it
“encapsulate[s] a community’s perceptions of its origins, its identity, or
its commitments, and thereby advance[s] the lives of its members.” 20
Both meanings are in play here. Calling Klein a myth suggests that our
common judicial and scholarly understanding is wrong (false). But it
also suggests that this wrong (false) understanding is fundamental or
necessary to the understanding and functioning of the political-legal
community. 21
Both of Klein’s twin myths are false—the precedent is neither
meaninglessly indeterminate nor vigorous.
However inartfully written, the “doctrine” of Klein is not
indeterminate. Read historically with subsequent elaboration, limitation,
and application, Klein readily admits of several related, clearly
identifiable constitutional principles. Once past the sweeping and
inaccurate rhetoric of the opinion itself, three core principles 22 emerge:
(1) Congress cannot dictate to courts the outcome of particular litigation
or command how courts should resolve particular legal and factual
questions in a case; 23 (2) Congress cannot compel courts to speak a
“constitutional untruth” by dictating how to understand and apply the
Constitution where courts’ independent judgment compels a different
understanding or conclusion; 24 and (3) Congress cannot enact legislation
depriving individuals of their constitutional rights. 25 The problem is that
none of these principles is groundbreaking; all are common ideas,
18. Compare, e.g., Sager, supra note 4, at 2532–33, with Meltzer, supra note 14, at 2543.
Compare Schiavo ex rel Schindler v. Schiavo, 404 F.3d 1270, 1274–75 (11th Cir. 2005) (Birch, J.,
specially concurring in denial of rehearing en banc), with Hartnett, supra note 4, at 580–81.
19. Pettys, supra note 1, at 992–93.
20. Id. at 993.
21. Id. Fred Bloom captures the same idea in his concept of the “noble lie.” Bloom, Noble Lie,
supra note 1, at 975.
22. Because the statute at issue in Klein targeted the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction, infra notes
61–65 and accompanying text, a fourth reading of the case treats it as about “fundamental and timeless
constraint on Congress’ otherwise broad authority to control the jurisdiction of the federal courts.”
Tyler, supra note 7, at 88. The jurisdictional point largely has fallen away in Klein discussions,
however.
23. Infra Part III.A.
24. Meltzer, supra note 14, at 2545; Sager, supra note 4, at 2529; infra Part III.B.
25. Hartnett, supra note 4, at 580; infra Part III.C.
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reflected in other precedents and constitutional doctrines. Moreover,
they do little to provide a judicial basis for invalidating overreaching
legislation.
Even if false, however, Klein’s twin myths nevertheless remain
fundamental to our community’s constitutional self-understanding. 26
Klein is a product of a unique time—the Civil War and
Reconstruction—and a unique set of political and constitutional
pathologies. 27 That pathology included Union efforts to bring rebellious
states and citizens back into the fold; a unique class of confiscated
enemy property and efforts by property owners to recover proceeds; 28
and a three-way power struggle among Radical Republicans dominating
Congress, Democratic President Andrew Johnson (and his non-Radical
Republican successor, Ulysses S. Grant), and the Supreme Court. 29
Klein suggests that the Court can and will, in the extreme case, protect
itself from the encroachment of other branches. Alternatively, Klein
works to keep Congress from pursuing its worst excesses in enacting
legislation that genuinely might so invade the judicial province. With
Klein in the background, Congress dare not approach the constitutional
line or engage in extreme separation-of-powers brinksmanship.
At least not in ordinary times. If Klein is a product of constitutional
pathology, it does its constitutional heavy lifting only in similar periods.
Genuinely Klein-violative legislation—in which Congress truly
oversteps the limits of separation of powers—thus arises only in the
worst of times. 30 This perhaps justifies the “cult of Klein,” reverence for
a tool that the Court uses to defend itself and the public against
congressional overreaching in most-desperate times. If that is Klein’s
purpose, a fully contextualized understanding of the case and its
resulting doctrine is necessary. Whatever the socio-legal benefits the
legal community derives from holding on to the myth of Klein and
maintaining its cult as a separation-of-powers bulwark, its practical use
and strength as a judicial tool to invalidate real, even pathological,
legislation is a falsehood.
Instead, recent Klein-vulnerable legislation and proposals are
26. Pettys, supra note 1, at 993.
27. See Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85 COLUM. L.
REV. 449, 459 (1985) (defining pathology as “the phenomenon of an unusually serious challenge to one
or more of the central norms of the constitutional regime”).
28. See United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 136–37 (1871).
29. Infra notes 53–58, 216–221 and accompanying text.
30. Although Vincent Blasi’s seminal work on constitutional pathology focuses on the role of the
First Amendment in pathological times, he speaks in terms of constitutionalism generally and the need
for stability as to basic structural arrangements. Blasi, supra note 27, at 453. This logically includes
separation of powers and the arrangements of power among the three branches. Id.; infra Part IV.
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criticized and objected to as politically regrettable or unwise
congressional enactments, especially for those who want to see private
litigation used to enforce accountability on government and its officers.
The instinct towards broad judicial independence and supremacy leads
to a visceral sense that Congress overstepped its bounds, even if only as
a policy matter. But there is a central distinction between bad or unwise
public policy and unconstitutional action. 31
Couching policy
preferences in constitutional Klein terms does not change this.
This article proceeds in four steps. Part II examines Klein in its full
historical and political context, looking particularly at the Court’s
sweeping, although largely inaccurate, rhetoric.
This overbroad
language reveals much of how the myth of Klein and the cult
surrounding that myth was born and has evolved.
Part III identifies three core principles associated with Klein,
subsequent case law, and commentary. This Part shows Klein as a
fiction, revealing that there are clear principles and ideas discernable
from the case and that it is neither as opaque or as meaningless as many
suggest, but that the principles are not unique, groundbreaking, or
meaningfully constraining on Congress. In other words, Klein is not as
vigorous as many believe.
Part IV considers the historic pathological context of Klein and how
that context affects the doctrine’s current understanding and use. In
particular, it examines why extreme legislation that would violate Klein
has not been enacted, perhaps suggesting that Klein plays a slightly more
vigorous role outside the courts, as an ex ante check, keeping Congress
from following its worst populist instincts. Of course, pathological
periods, such as those giving rise to the legislation at issue in Klein,
occur precisely when that legislative check is most likely to be ignored.
Part V examines the problem of conflating bad policy with
unconstitutional policy, a conflation to which Klein contributes. With its
broad language, apparent indeterminacy, purportedly empty core, and
perceived historical pedigree as a separation-of-powers, judicialindependence trump card—that is, in light of the twin myths of opacity
and vigor—Klein takes on an all-things-to-all-people quality. 32 It
becomes the ideal vehicle for constitutionalizing those ordinary policy
preferences, however inappropriate such constitutionalization might be.
United States v. Klein is a myth in both senses of the word—a source
of rarely used and genuinely ineffectual constitutional principles, but
principles on which we continue to place great rhetorical weight and
31. Gerald Gunther, Congressional Power to Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction: An
Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L. REV. 895, 898 (1984).
32. Young, supra note 4, at 1195.

WASSERMAN FINAL FORMAT 2

2010]

2/11/2011 3:43:02 PM

THE IRREPRESSIBLE MYTH OF KLEIN

59

through which we define our legal convictions and constitutional
culture.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF KLEIN
Klein arises out of the historical milieu of the Civil War and its
aftermath and the unique political and inter-branch pathologies
accompanying that time. The false belief in Klein’s vigor and in Klein
as a significant tool for judicially enforcing the limits on congressional
power too readily ignores that historical context.
During the Civil War, Congress enacted a series of laws to address
the unique legal problem of abandoned and confiscated property in the
South. Congress particularly targeted cotton, the sale of which financed
the Confederate war effort. 33 The first law, enacted in 1861, provided
for forfeiture of all property used in aiding, abetting, and promoting the
insurrection. 34 In 1862, a second statute empowered the President to
make a public warning to those engaged in or aiding the rebellion to
cease on threat of forfeiture of property.35
The central act was passed in 1863. 36 Congress empowered the
Secretary of the Treasury to appoint agents to receive abandoned and
captured property, sell it, and deposit proceeds into the general
treasury. 37 The 1863 Act also established procedures through which the
owner of abandoned or captured property could bring a claim to recover
proceeds in the Court of Claims:
[A]ny person claiming to have been the owner of any such abandoned or
captured property may, at any time within two years after the suppression
of the rebellion, prefer his claim to the proceeds thereof in the Court of
Claims; and on proof to the satisfaction of said court of his ownership of
said property, of his right to the proceeds thereof, and that he has never
given any aid or comfort to the present rebellion, to receive the residue of
such proceeds . . . . 38

At the same time, Congress laid the groundwork for bringing
Confederate sympathizers back into the Union. An 1862 law had invited

33. Tyler, supra note 7, at 88–89; Young, supra note 4, at 1203–04.
34. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 130 (1871) (citing Act of Aug. 6, 1861, 12
Stat. 319 (1861)).
35. Id. at 130 (citing Act of July 17, 1862, 12 Stat. 589 (1862)).
36. Young, supra note 4, at 1197–98.
37. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 131, 138; Tyler, supra note 7, at 89; Young, supra note 4, at
1198.
38. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 131 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Abandoned Property Collection
Act, ch. 120, § 3, 12 Stat. 820 (1863)); Young, supra note 4, at 1198.
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the President to extend pardon and amnesty 39 to all persons who had
participated in the rebellion on terms and conditions “expedient for the
public welfare.” 40 President Lincoln did so in December 1863, granting
a full blanket pardon to all who had engaged in rebellion as participants
or aiders-and-abettors, restoring all of their property rights, except as to
slaves, upon the taking and keeping of a prescribed oath to support the
Union, the Constitution, and all acts and proclamations regarding
slaves. 41 Lincoln defended the oath requirement:
Laws and proclamations were enacted and put forth for the purpose of
aiding in the suppression of the rebellion. To give them their fullest
effect there had to be a pledge for their maintenance. In my judgment
they have aided, and will further aid, the cause for which they were
intended. . . . [I]t is believed the Executive may lawfully claim it in return
for pardon and restoration of forfeited rights . . . . 42

In July 1863, following Grant’s victory at Vicksburg, Union agents,
acting under authority of the 1863 Act, seized six hundred bales of
cotton belonging to V.F. Wilson; Wilson had marked the cotton
“C.S.A.” to ensure its safe passage through the South. 43 The cotton was
sold for more than $125,000, and the proceeds were deposited in the
Union general treasury. 44 Wilson had acted as a surety on bonds for
Confederate officers. 45 In February 1864, following Lincoln’s pardon
proclamation, Wilson took the required oath and received a pardon. 46
In 1865, Klein, the executor of Wilson’s estate, successfully
petitioned the Court of Claims to recover proceeds from the sale of the
cotton. The court initially found that Wilson had been loyal in fact
because he had given no aid or comfort to the rebellion. The
government subsequently presented evidence that Wilson had acted as a
surety—a fact to which Klein stipulated—an act which the Supreme
Court had held constituted giving aid and comfort to the rebellion.
Nevertheless, the Court of Claims reaffirmed its judgment, finding the
subsequent pardon removed the consequences of any actual disloyalty
39. Formally the law “authorized” the pardon. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 139. But the
President believed he held and could exercise the pardon power without congressional authorization.
Id.; Tyler, supra note 7, at 90.
40. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 139–40.
41. Id. at 140; Tyler, supra note 7, at 89–90.
42. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 140 (quoting President Abraham Lincoln, State of the Union
Address (Dec. 8, 1863)). This was the first of several blanket pardons issued over the next several years.
Id. at 140–42.
43. Young, supra note 4, at 1192.
44. Id. at 1198.
45. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 132; Young, supra note 4, at 1199.
46. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 132; Tyler, supra note 7, at 91–92; Young, supra note 4, at 1199.
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and rendered him legally, if not factually, loyal. 47
While the government’s appeal was pending, the Supreme Court
decided United States v. Padelford, 48 a factually similar claim to recover
proceeds on confiscated-and-sold property by a former Confederate
surety who had taken the required oath and received a pardon. 49
Padelford had been disloyal in fact by acting as a surety for a
Confederate officer. 50 Reading the 1863 Act authorizing payment of
proceeds to those who could prove loyalty in conjunction with the 1862
law inviting presidential pardon reveals congressional intent to permit
recovery by those who were factually loyal and by those rendered
legally loyal by pardon. 51 The pardon rendered Padelford innocent in
law—as though he never had given aid and comfort—and purged his
property of any taint. 52
Radical Republicans in Congress were outraged with the Padelford
decision because it appeared to let off the hook the wealthy cotton
growers who had financed the southern insurrection and who
Republicans sought to sanction. 53
Congressional objections to
Padelford and to the Court of Claims decision in Klein were part of
broader discontents. In 1867, Congress statutorily removed the
invitation or authorization for presidential pardon in confiscatedproperty cases, 54 likely as part of a broader, ongoing battle with
President Andrew Johnson. 55 Padelford was one of a series of Supreme
Court decisions that rejected, narrowed, or interfered with the
Republicans’ Reconstruction agenda. 56 Congressional disaffection with
the decision, and subsequent efforts to undo its effects, 57 were part of
47. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 132; Tyler, supra note 7, at 93; Young, supra note 4, at 1199.
48. 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 531 (1870).
49. Id. at 539–42; Young, supra note 4, at 1201–03. One difference, ultimately irrelevant, was
that Padelford took the oath and received the pardon before his property was seized, while Wilson came
forward for the pardon only after the seizure. Id. at 1201 n.62. See Hartnett, supra note 4, at 573.
50. Padelford, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) at 539; Young, supra note 4, at 1201–02.
51. Padelford, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) at 543; Young, supra note 4, at 1202–03.
52. Padelford, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) at 543.
53. Tyler, supra note 7, at 94–95; Young, supra note 4, at 1193, 1204.
54. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 141–42 (1871).
55. See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 247–48 (1988);
Laura F. Edwards, The Civil War and Reconstruction, in 2 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LAW IN
AMERICA 329 (Michael Grossberg & Christopher Tomlins eds., 2008). Johnson was impeached a year
later. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE, VOL. 2: TRANSFORMATIONS 18–20 (1998) [hereinafter
ACKERMAN, VOL. 2]; FONER, supra, at 333–35; Edwards, supra, at 329–30.
56. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE, VOL. 1: FOUNDATIONS 101 (1991) [hereinafter
ACKERMAN, VOL. 1]; FONER, supra note 55, at 529; Edwards, supra note 55, at 335; see also, e.g.,
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873); Blyew v. United States, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 581
(1872).
57. When Senator Drake took to the Senate floor and introduced legislation to undo Klein and
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broader political jockeying among Congress, the President, and the
Court regarding the direction of the post-bellum nation, particularly on
matters of national power and the reintegration of southern states and
citizens into the Union. 58
Congress’ response reflected an unabashed attempt to undo the lower
court judgment in Klein and to ensure that no future cases resulted in
judgments for claimants relying on pardons. Two parts of the legislative
response, contained in a proviso to an 1870 spending bill, achieved that
result. First, Congress provided that
[N]o pardon or amnesty granted by the President . . . nor any acceptance
of such pardon or amnesty, nor oath taken . . . shall be admissible in
evidence on the part of any claimant in the Court of Claims as evidence in
support of any claim against the United States . . . but the proof of loyalty
required [by the 1863 Act] shall be made by proof of the matters required,
irrespective of the effect of any executive proclamation, pardon, amnesty,
or other act of condonation or oblivion. 59

Further, the proviso deemed that when a claimant had received a
pardon
[A]nd such pardon shall recite in substance that such person took part in
the late rebellion . . . or was guilty of any act of rebellion . . . and such
pardon shall have been accepted in writing by the person to whom the
same issued without an express disclaimer of, and protestation against,
such fact of guilt contained in such acceptance, such pardon and
acceptance shall be taken and deemed . . . conclusive evidence that such
person did take part in, and give aid and comfort to, the late rebellion[.] 60

The question remained of what to do in pending cases such as Klein,
where the Court of Claims had rendered judgment in favor of the
claimant based on his having been made legally innocent by virtue of the
pardon. The original Senate bill would have required the Supreme Court
to reverse any judgments for pardoned claimants that were pending on
appeal, presumably resulting in a remand and a new determination by
the Court of Claims, with the likely result that the claimant would lose
on remand under the new legal rule that an uncontested pardon was
conclusive proof of disloyalty. 61 During the Senate debates, support
similar decisions, he waved a copy of Padelford. See Young, supra note 4, at 1204.
58. See ACKERMAN, VOL. 2, supra note 55, at 123, 199–200, 209; FONER, supra note 55, at 183–
84, 237–38, 250–51; Edwards, supra note 55, at 327–29; infra notes 216–221 and accompanying text.
59. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 133–34, 143 (quoting Act of July 12, 1870, ch. 251, 18 Stat. 230
(1870)); Young, supra note 4, at 1207–08.
60. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 134 (quoting Act of July 12, 1870, ch. 251, 18 Stat. 230 (1870)),
143–44.
61. Tyler, supra note 7, at 95–96; Young, supra note 4, at 1204–05, 1210.
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shifted to reliance on congressional power over the Supreme Court’s
appellate jurisdiction. 62 The bill stripped the Court of appellate
jurisdiction over all cases in which a pardon had been used as evidence
of loyalty, requiring the Court to dismiss “the cause” for want of
jurisdiction. 63 Importantly, Republicans intended this to mean dismissal
of “the case—everything.” 64 It was not enough to have the appeal to the
Supreme Court dismissed, which would have left the Wilson Estate with
its Court of Claims judgment in tact; Congress wanted the lower-court
judgment undone and the entire lawsuit dismissed where the claim was
based on a pardon. 65
The Klein Court struck back, invalidating the proviso and its
purported limits on appellate jurisdiction. First, the Court rejected the
argument that the proviso was a permissible exercise of congressional
power under the Exceptions Clause. 66 The proviso did not withhold
appellate jurisdiction “except as a means to an end” of denying
presidential pardons the effect that the Court adjudged them to have in
Padelford. 67 Rather, the purpose of the law was to “deny to pardons
granted by the President the effect which this court had adjudged them
to have.” 68
The denial of jurisdiction to the Supreme Court was “founded solely
on the application of a rule of decision, in causes pending, prescribed by
Congress.” 69 Congress was not appropriately regulating appellate
jurisdiction, but “prescrib[ing] a rule for the decision of a cause in a
particular way.” 70 This was “not an exercise of the acknowledged
power of Congress” over the Court’s appellate jurisdiction. 71 The Court
was required to dismiss the appeal, even if it believed the judgment
below should be affirmed by virtue of the pardon. 72 Such a requirement
was problematic in two respects: (1) it allowed the government, as a
party to the case, to decide in its own favor; and (2) it allowed Congress
to prescribe rules of decision to the judiciary in pending cases. 73

62. Young, supra note 4, at 1207–08. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
63. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 134.
64. Young, supra note 4, at 1208 (quoting legislative debates and statements of Senator
Edmunds, sponsor of the final measure).
65. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 134; Young, supra note 4, at 1210, 1221–22.
66. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 145.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 146.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
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The Klein Court distinguished its own decision in Pennsylvania v.
Wheeling Bridge Company. 74 After a court had decreed that a particular
bridge was a public nuisance and ordered its abatement, Congress redesignated the bridge as a post road, eliminating the need for
abatement. 75 The Supreme Court held that the original nuisance decree
no longer was enforceable because the bridge had, by virtue of the new
law and new legal designation, ceased to be a nuisance and ceased to
require abatement. 76 The difference between Klein and Wheeling
Bridge was that in the latter Congress had not prescribed any “arbitrary”
rule of decision. 77
Rather, Congress had created new legal
circumstances to which the Court simply applied ordinary rules. 78 By
contrast, in Klein Congress had forbidden the Court to give the pardon
the evidentiary effect the Court, in its own judgment, believed it should
have, instead directing the Court to give it the precisely contrary effect. 79
The second, seemingly separate basis for rejecting the legislation was
that it impaired the effect of a presidential pardon. By requiring the
Court to view pardons as evidence of disloyalty, it functionally required
the Court to treat them as null and void, without legal effect. 80 This
infringed the Executive’s constitutional power. 81 More problematically,
it compelled the courts to be instrumental in that infringement. 82
The recognized defects in the proviso dictated the result in Klein
itself—deny the government’s motion to dismiss the appeal and to
reverse the Court of Claims decision awarding proceeds to Wilson’s
Estate. The more difficult question is what to do with Klein, specifically
its broad language and established principles. We turn to that question
next.
III. THREE JUDICIALLY ENFORCEABLE PRINCIPLES
It is an article of academic faith that Klein is, at best, lacking clarity
and, at worst, opaque. 83 But calling it opaque lends indeterminacy, and
74. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421 (1855).
75. Id. at 429. See also Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 146; Redish & Pudelski, supra note 4, at
446–47.
76. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 146 (discussing Wheeling, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 421).
77. Id. at 146–47; Hartnett, supra note 4, at 579.
78. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 147.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.; Araiza, supra note 14, at 1075 (describing problem that proviso made courts into
Congress’ “constitutional puppet”).
83. See sources cited supra notes 14–16.
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a presumed meaninglessness, to the resulting doctrine that allows Kleinbased arguments to at least be raised against all manner of laws. 84 In
fact, careful reading of Klein, in light of its evolution in subsequent—
and more recent—cases, reveals three clear, somewhat related judicially
enforceable constitutional principles. Paradoxically, however, avoiding
indeterminacy and revealing core principles runs headlong into the
doctrine’s lack of vigor. The identifiable principles are neither
exceptional nor particularly powerful limits on Congress that can be
wielded to invalidate likely or significant legislation.
In other words, the twin myths of Klein stand and fall together.
Wading through the case and its progeny reveals a core meaning;
finding that core meaning shows that the underlying principles lack real
doctrinal force.
A. Congressional Control over Fact-Finding and Litigation Outcomes
One potential principle of Klein is that there are limits on
congressional control over substantive legal rules and litigation
outcomes under those rules.
1. Dictating Substantive Rules of Decision
Oft-cited language in Klein prohibits Congress from prescribing rules
of decision for cases in federal courts. The Court criticized the 1870
proviso as denying jurisdiction “solely on the application of a rule of
decision, in causes pending, prescribed by Congress.” 85
Importantly, however, no act of Congress—other than the proviso in
Klein itself—has been deemed unconstitutional under that principle. 86
Moreover, that statement cannot literally be true. 87 Congress prescribes
rules of decision whenever it enacts substantive law that controls
primary conduct and establishes the legal rules courts apply to resolve
disputes under that substantive law. Consider, for example, the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. 88 In prohibiting employers from firing people
“because of” race and other characteristics, Congress established a rule
of decision that courts apply in resolving discrimination claims under the
84. See Young, supra note 4, at 1195. See also Tyler, supra note 7, at 103–04.
85. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 146 (1871); Hartnett, supra note 4, at 577;
Redish & Pudelski, supra note 4, at 444–45.
86. Hartnett, supra note 4, at 581.
87. Meltzer, supra note 14, at 2549; Redish & Pudelski, supra note 4, at 446 (labeling the
Court’s statement “wrong”); Tyler, supra note 7, at 105 (“This proposition cannot be reconciled with the
settled principle that courts are obliged to apply otherwise valid law as they find it.”).
88. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006).
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statute; the rule requires a court to find in favor of, and grant relief to, a
plaintiff who can present evidence showing that he was fired because of
racial animosity. 89
The Klein Court seemed to recognize the literal incoherence of that
language, as indicated by its efforts to distinguish Wheeling Bridge. 90
By redefining the bridge as a post road under federal law, Congress
imposed a new rule of decision to be applied by the Court—the bridge
took on its congressionally defined status and the Court was bound by
that status. The Court distinguished Wheeling Bridge on the ground that
Congress had not prescribed an “arbitrary rule of decision,” but simply
had left courts to “apply its ordinary rules to the new circumstances
created by the act.” 91 But those new circumstances properly included a
new rule of decision: the bridge was a federally designated post road and
could not be a public nuisance as a matter of federal law.
Subsequent cases have reconciled Klein and Wheeling Bridge by
recognizing that Congress remains free to amend generally controlling
substantive law, even as that change affects litigation by establishing a
new rule of decision. 92
Congress can change substantive law
prospectively, retrospectively, or both.
Although Klein twice
emphasized the problem of the proviso applying to pending cases, 93
courts regularly apply valid law in effect at the time a case is being
decided, even where controlling law has changed during pendency of a
case or between trial court judgment and appeal. 94 Congress only needs
to make its retroactive intent plain. 95 Lower courts have become highly
deferential to such changes in law, so long as Congress changes the
overall substantive legal landscape—the new legal circumstances 96 —in

89. Hartnett, supra note 4, at 577–78. See also Araiza, supra note 14, at 1059 (“[A]ll legislation
amounts to the imposition of legal liability on individuals involved in certain fact patterns.”).
90. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 146–47 (discussing Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge
Co., 54 U.S. (13 How.) 518 (1851)); Redish & Pudelski, supra note 4, at 446–47.
91. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 146–47; Redish & Pudelski, supra note 4, at 446–47.
92. See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 218 (1995); Robertson v. Seattle Audubon
Soc’y, 503 U.S. 429, 440–41 (1992); Ecology Ctr. v. Castaneda, 426 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir. 2005);
Nat’l Coalition to Save Our Mall v. Norton, 269 F.3d 1092, 1096–97 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Redish &
Pudelski, supra note 4, at 456–57; Sager, supra note 4, at 2527.
93. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 146 (stating that the government argument “is founded solely on
the application of a rule of decision, in causes pending, prescribed by Congress” and questioning, “[c]an
we do so without allowing that the legislature may prescribe rules of decision to the Judicial Department
of the government in cases pending before it?”).
94. Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 273 (1994); Hartnett, supra note 4, at 578;
Redish & Pudelski, supra note 4, at 446; Tyler, supra note 7, at 105; Young, supra note 4, at 1240
n.238.
95. Plaut, 514 U.S. at 226; Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 270.
96. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 147.
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some “detectable way.” 97 So narrowed, this principle does not impose
meaningful limits on congressional power. It holds Klein in check,
keeping it from imposing overbroad restrictions on Congress’ essential
ability to legislate in beneficial and necessary ways. 98
Another explanation for the outcome in Klein is that the proviso
targeted specific, pending litigation. Congress was aware that the
government’s appeal in Klein was pending and that Padelford
controlled, which meant the government likely would lose on appeal. In
his comprehensive history of Klein, Gordon Young demonstrates that
Senate Radical Republicans knew it would be insufficient merely to
control the evidentiary effect of pardons prospectively because that
would leave in place judgments already rendered by the Court of
Claims. 99 It was thus necessary for Congress specifically to target cases
pending on appeal, whether by requiring the Court to reverse judgments
based on pardons, as initially proposed by Senator Drake, or by stripping
the Court of appellate jurisdiction over such appeals with a requirement
to dismiss “the cause,” as ultimately enacted. 100
But even this anti-targeting principle does not do much work. The
closest call was Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Society. 101 The case arose
out of an ongoing controversy over Northwest timber harvesting and its
effect on the habitat of the spotted owl. 102
Two lawsuits by
environmental groups challenged the government’s management of
thirteen national forests and Bureau of Land Management lands in
Oregon and Washington as being contrary to five separate federal
statutes. 103 In the Northwest Timber Compromise of 1990, Congress
established comprehensive new rules governing timber harvesting for a
limited period of time, expanding harvesting in some areas while
prohibiting it in others. 104 At the heart of the controversy was a
provision stating:
97. Gray v. First Winthrop Corp., 989 F.2d 1564, 1569–70 (9th Cir. 1993).
98. See Araiza, supra note 14, at 1075 (“In a very real sense, any conventional statute ‘directs
results,’ yet the enactment of statutes remains the quintessential legislative function.”); Hartnett, supra
note 4, at 577–78; Redish & Pudelski, supra note 4, at 448 (“[T]here exists no reason, in constitutional
theory or doctrine, why Congress may not enact subconstitutional, generally applicable rules of
decision . . . .”).
99. Young, supra note 4, at 1210, 1221–22.
100. Id. at 1208, 1210.
101. 503 U.S. 429 (1992).
102. Id. at 431–32; Araiza, supra note 14, at 1065; Redish & Pudelski, supra note 4, at 455–56;
Sager, supra note 4, at 2527.
103. Robertson, 503 U.S. at 432; Araiza, supra note 14, at 1065; Redish & Pudelski, supra note 4,
at 456; Sager, supra note 4, at 2527.
104. Robertson, 503 U.S. at 433; Araiza, supra note 14, at 1065; Redish & Pudelski, supra note 4,
at 456; Sager, supra note 4, at 2527.
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Congress hereby determines and directs that management of areas
according to [provisions of the Compromise] on the thirteen national
forests in Oregon and Washington . . . is adequate consideration for the
purpose of meeting the statutory requirements that are the basis for [the
two pending district court cases, mentioned by name]. 105

The Supreme Court upheld the compromise as a permissible
alteration of substantive law. 106 The targeted lawsuits initially would
have succeeded if the challenged harvesting violated any of five statutes,
but those claims now failed so long as the harvesting did not violate
either of the two relevant provisions in the amending statute. 107 The
Court was not troubled by the explicit statutory reference to pending
litigation, which simply was generalized shorthand for identifying the
five previous statutory requirements that formed the basis for the
lawsuits and that functionally had been amended by the Compromise.
Instead of naming each statutory provision amended, Congress named
the litigation in which the now-amended provisions were in play.108
Any effect on the two pending cases still resulted from the modification
of applicable substantive law.
Robertson marked the closest Congress has come to violating the
principle of Klein and many commentators argue that the Court was
wrong not to strike down the law. 109 Paradoxically, Robertson makes it
easier for courts to reject constitutional challenges to future legislation—
after all, if the legislation at issue in Robertson did not violate Klein,
nothing will. 110 Consider the D.C. Circuit’s decision in National
Coalition to Save Our Mall v. Norton. 111 The plaintiffs brought an
action seeking to enjoin construction of the World War II Memorial on
the National Mall, alleging that various federal agencies and officials
had violated a host of federal statutes in approving the Memorial design

105. Robertson, 503 U.S. at 434–35 (quoting Department of the Interior and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act, 1990, § 318(b)(6)(A), 103 Stat. 745 (1990)); Sager, supra note 4, at 2527.
106. Robertson, 503 U.S. at 438, 440–41.
107. Id. at 438. See Araiza, supra note 14, at 1059, 1072; Redish & Pudelski, supra note 4, at
457; Sager, supra note 4, at 2527. See also Araiza, supra note 14, at 1071 (“The key to the Court’s
conclusion . . . seems to have been its observation that . . . [the amended law] would operate to change
defendants’ duties under statutes . . . .”).
108. Araiza, supra note 14, at 1058; Redish & Pudelski, supra note 4, at 456; Sager, supra note 4,
at 2527.
109. Araiza, supra note 14, at 1059 (“[I]t is hard to avoid the feeling that there is something
inappropriately non-legislative about this statute.”); Redish & Pudelski, supra note 4, at 455 (arguing
that Robertson shows the Court playing “fast and loose” with this principle); Sager, supra note 4, at
2527.
110. Nat’l Coal. to Save Our Mall v. Norton, 269 F.3d 1092, 1097 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (rejecting
Klein argument as to statute that “presents no more difficulty than the statute upheld” in Robertson).
111. 269 F.3d 1092 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
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and construction. 112 While litigation was pending, Congress enacted a
law requiring expeditious construction of the Memorial,
“notwithstanding any other provision of law.” 113 Again, Congress used
generalized blanket language to functionally amend any and all laws that
might have been used to block construction. Congress did not identify
the overridden statutory provisions by name, but left it for the courts to
ascertain that all laws in play in the pending case had been superseded.
Save Our Mall captures the emptiness of the argument that legislation
is invalid if too litigation-specific. First, it was clear under Wheeling
Bridge that Congress could have imposed new standards in identifiable
cases that already had proceeded to judgment and to issuance of an
injunction. Congress thus can impose new substantive rules in pending
actions for injunctive relief where no injunction had been issued at the
time of the legislative change. 114 Second, plaintiffs in Save Our Mall
conceded during oral argument that the new legislation would have been
a valid amendment to substantive law had it been enacted prior to
commencement of the lawsuit, even if enacted in explicit anticipation of
that particular lawsuit. 115 Given that concession, the court rejected the
idea that specificity became fatal merely because the legislation was
enacted against a pending, rather than anticipated, lawsuit that had not
yet proceeded to judgment.
2. Dictating Facts and Outcomes
Rhetoric aside, Congress has power to prescribe non-rights-infringing
rules of decision that bind courts, even through retroactive amendments
to existing rules made applicable to pending cases. 116 Establishing and
amending legal rules entails determining legal standards, identifying the
significant legal and factual issues that courts must apply to a set of
circumstances, and dictating the legal consequences that flow from the
courts’ application of the legal standards to a set of facts. 117
What really is going on under Klein is a prohibition on Congress
using its legislative power to predetermine litigation outcomes through
explicit commands to courts as to how to resolve particular factual and
112. Id. at 1093–94.
113. Id. at 1094 (quoting Approval of World War II Memorial Site and Design, Pub. L. No 10711, § 1, 115 Stat. 19 (2001)).
114. Id. at 1097.
115. Id.
116. Araiza, supra note 14, at 1075 n.97; Hartnett, supra note 4, at 578; Tyler, supra note 7, at
106; supra notes 92–98 and accompanying text.
117. Araiza, supra note 14, at 1059 (“[A]ll legislation amounts to the imposition of legal liability
on individuals involved in certain fact patterns.”).
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legal issues or telling courts who should prevail on given facts under
existing law. 118 This knocks out blatant examples—such as a law
stating “In the case of A v. B, pending in the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida, A shall prevail,” or “In all cases
filed, courts shall find that no federal environmental laws were violated
in the management of national forest lands.” 119
But such blatantly violative enactments seem unlikely, which perhaps
explains why no actual laws have been invalidated under this
principle. 120 Consider Robertson again. Although the 1990 law
explicitly referenced pending litigation, it did not dictate which party
should prevail, did not dictate findings of fact, and did not command a
conclusion that any particular timber harvests or sales violated federal
law. The amended law merely established new legal standards to be
applied in determining the validity of sales and harvests; it did not
dictate how to apply those legal standards. The court still determined
whether those standards had been satisfied and decided the case
accordingly. 121
118. Id. at 1079, 1088 (describing distinction between Congress changing law and Congress
directing results in particular cases, although recognizing the difficulty courts have had in drawing the
line); Caminker, supra note 4, at 539 (calling this the “narrower and more traditional understanding of
the Klein principle”); Redish & Pudelski, supra note 4, at 445 (“If Congress may not itself resolve
individual litigations, its direction to the courts as to how to resolve specific disputes is constitutionally
problematic.”); Martin H. Redish, Federal Judicial Independence: Constitutional and Political
Perspectives, 46 MERCER L. REV. 697, 718 (1995) (“Congress may not, through legislation, dictate the
resolution of a particular litigation”); Jed Handelsman Shugerman, A Six-Three Rule: Reviving
Consensus and Deference on the Supreme Court, 37 GA. L. REV. 893, 979 (2003) (arguing that best
reading of Klein is “prohibition against Congress dictating specific results or interpretations of laws and
facts”).
119. See Araiza, supra note 14, at 1125 (“[A] statute deeming pre-existing law to be satisfied is
analogous to a judicial decision reaching the same conclusion . . . .”); Gunther, supra note 31, at 910;
Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts: An Exercise
in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1373 (1953) (“I can easily read into Article III a limitation on the
power of Congress to tell the court how to decide it.”); Redish & Pudelski, supra note 4, at 457 (“Any
legislation that directs findings in specifically referenced litigation should categorically be deemed to
violate Klein.”); Redish, supra note 118, at 718 (arguing that “every observer reasonably” can
understand that “Congress may not adjudicate individual litigations”).
120. The Court has invalidated similar laws without relying on Klein. This arguably is the case
with United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828 (1987). The Court struck down a federal statute that
prohibited collateral challenges to the constitutionality of a prior administrative order of deportation
where that order was an element of a subsequent crime, unlawful reentry after deportation, prosecuted in
federal court. Id. at 837–39. Although the context was different, functionally the statute forced courts
to accept a non-judicial factual determination and prohibited courts from engaging in independent
analysis about the constitutionality of the underlying order, which is—what this principle of Klein
purports to invalidate. Yet the Court never mentioned Klein. See also Estep v. United States, 327 U.S.
114, 123–25 (1946) (reading statute to permit judicial review of constitutionality of draft board order in
subsequent prosecution for refusing induction, without citing Klein). Thanks to Gordon Young for
raising this point.
121. Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc’y, 503 U.S. 429, 438–39 (1992); see Ecology Ctr. v.
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Consider Plaut v. Spendthrift Farms, 122 where the Supreme Court
addressed congressional creation of a new, potentially longer limitations
period for certain securities fraud claims. 123 The new provision stated
that any claims previously dismissed as time-barred under the old
limitations rule should be reinstated if the claim would have been timely
under the new rule. 124 The new limitations period “indisputably does set
out substantive legal standards for the Judiciary to apply, and in that
sense changes the law (even if solely retroactively).”125 Yet the Court
rejected a Klein challenge. The law did not dictate to courts how to
decide the facts underlying the limitations issue or whether to conclude
that a particular claim was timely under the controlling period. The law
only told courts the length of the new period and the legal consequences
of judicially determined conclusions in a case involving particular
factual circumstances.
Of course, all legislation “directs results” and imposes legal liability
on certain fact patterns. 126 Congress thus does not impermissibly dictate
outcomes so long as it merely identifies the relevant legal and factual
issues that dictate outcomes. Klein only requires that courts be left a
role; courts must retain the power to exercise their independent best
judgment to find facts, to apply the legal standard to those facts, to
decide whether the congressionally dictated rule of decision has been
satisfied or violated, and to decide the outcome of the case before the
court.
Accepting that legal rules direct results presents a wrinkle: Congress
designs legal rules, either in the first instance or through an amendment
to the substantive legal landscape, with the “hope” that rules produce
certain outcomes on certain facts. This is always Congress’ purpose in
enacting or modifying the law—to achieve substantive policy goals
through the operation and judicial enforcement of legal rules. 127
Liability rules seek to protect and incentivize conduct deemed socially
beneficial while sanctioning or deterring conduct deemed socially
Castaneda, 426 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir. 2005) (stating that Klein is not violated where Congress
changed the underlying law but left to the courts the role of determining whether new legal criteria had
been met); Sager, supra note 4, at 2534.
122. 514 U.S. 211 (1995).
123. In Lampf, Pleva, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 364 (1991), the Court had
held that the limitations period on securities fraud claims expired one year after discovery of facts
showing the violation and within three years of the violation. Congress provided that, for all actions
filed on or before June 19, 1991 (the day Lampf was decided), district courts should adopt the limitations
period of the state in which they sat. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa-1 (2006); Plaut, 514 U.S. at 214–15.
124. § 788aa-1(b); Plaut, 514 U.S. at 214–15.
125. Plaut, 514 U.S. at 218.
126. Araiza, supra note 14, at 1059, 1075.
127. See id. at 1072.
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destructive. 128 When Congress prohibited racial discrimination in
employment in Title VII, it “hoped” that plaintiffs who could prove they
had been fired under certain circumstances would prevail in their
subsequent civil actions. When Congress enacted the 1990 Northwest
Timber Compromise, it hoped that some timber harvesting could go
forward under the more-relaxed standards and that a litigation effort to
stop harvesting would fail. Congress viewed the construction of the
World War II Memorial as a socially beneficial activity and altered rules
to eliminate legal barriers to that construction. 129
This is particularly true when Congress amends the legal landscape.
Congress has seen how courts have applied existing legal rules and it has
seen the outcomes of cases under those rules. Dissatisfied with those
results, Congress changes the legal rule and legal circumstances so that
future cases come out differently on similar facts. 130
But hoping for an outcome in a particular case under its legal rules is
not dictating that outcome.
If it were, all legislative-override
amendments would be invalid, which clearly is not the case. 131
Moreover, legislative intent remains the touchstone for determining
statutory meaning. 132 Courts must account for substantive legislative
goals reflected in the statute when applying the law to a set of facts in
litigation; legislative “hope” plays a necessary role in judicial
understanding and application of statutes. Nevertheless, it remains the
judicial domain to apply congressionally dictated legal standards to a set
of facts and to reach independent conclusions in a particular case.

128. See S. Jay Plager, Challenges for Intellectual Property Law in the Twenty-first Century:
Indeterminacy and Other Problems, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 69, 70; Richard A. Epstein, The Tort/Crime
Distinction: A Decade Later, 76 B.U. L. REV. 1, 4 (1996).
129. See Approval of World War II Memorial Site and Design, Pub. L. No. 107-11, 115 Stat. 19
(2001); Nat’l Coal. to Save Our Mall v. Norton, 269 F.3d 1092, 1093–94 (2001).
130. See Caminker, supra note 4, at 532–33; Deborah A. Widiss, Shadow Precedents and the
Separation of Powers: Statutory Interpretation of Congressional Overrides, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
511, 520, 525 (2009); see also Araiza, supra note 14, at 1127 (“Congress should be able to ensure that
its understanding of pre-existing law controls, by enacting a subsequent statute enshrining explicitly that
understanding.”).
131. See Widiss, supra note 130, at 525–26 (discussing statistics on frequency of congressional
overrides of judicial interpretations of federal statutes). For a recent example, see the Lilly Ledbetter
Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5, which overrode the Court’s decision on calculating
the limitations period on statutory equal-pay claims in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550
U.S. 618 (2007).
132. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 596 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(“[C]ongressional intent should guide us in matters of statutory interpretation.”); United States v.
Rosenbohm, 564 F.3d 820, 823 (7th Cir. 2009); James Brudney, Canon Shortfalls and the Virtues of
Political Branch Interpretive Assets (Ctr. for Interdisciplinary Law & Policy Studies, Working Paper
No. 123), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1597260.
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3. Klein as Drafting Rule
Unfortunately, this sounds like a dispute over legislative format,
turning Klein into nothing more than a drafting guide. 133 Congress can
avoid the force of Klein by its choice of statutory language and form.
By avoiding obviously problematic language—“A shall prevail against
B” or “The court shall find that federal rights were not violated”—
Congress preempts most Klein challenges.
There still will be close cases. Imagine that Congress wanted to
suspend the limitations period for a class of cases through a law
providing that certain claims may be brought “without regard” to the
statute of limitations. This statute admits of two readings. We might
read it to change the law to eliminate the statute of limitations as an
applicable defense and as an issue for the court to deal with;
alternatively, we might read it as Congress telling the court that, when
the limitations defense is raised, the court must reject the defense and
find the claim timely. 134 From the standpoint of protecting Congress’
ability to draft substantive law, the former is the better and necessary
reading. 135
Larry Sager and Evan Caminker recognize that this basic principle of
Klein can be overcome through alternative drafting. 136 But they reach
different conclusions about that fact. Sager argues that no-dictatingoutcomes cannot be the core principle of Klein because such an
understanding “threatens to exalt form over substance.” 137 In fact, the
Court did just that in Robertson, paying nominal obeisance to Klein but
discarding any meaningful distinction in the form that amending
legislation takes. 138 The principle does no meaningful constitutional
work; Congress can draft around it and courts look for ways to uphold
laws that come close to the line. 139
Caminker counters that even if only a drafting rule, it remains a rule
that matters. 140 Language is what law does. Statutory language makes a
difference to public understanding of potential conflicts between the
133. Caminker, supra note 4, at 542 (stating that Klein arguments “boil[] down to the question
whether the Klein rule is in practice nothing more than a trivial rule of drafting etiquette”).
134. Compare id. at 541 with id. at 540.
135. See Araiza, supra note 14, at 1133 (emphasizing propriety of Congress amending substantive
law by providing that new legal rule applies “notwithstanding” any other legal provisions).
136. See Caminker, supra note 4, at 541–42; Sager, supra note 4, at 2526–27. See also Araiza,
supra note 14, at 1134 (questioning whether a principle similar to Klein “may be problematic at its core:
easily evadable by expedients of unquestioned constitutionality”).
137. Sager, supra note 4, at 2526 (calling it “a relic of a more formalistic era”).
138. Id. at 2527.
139. See Araiza, supra note 14, at 1088–89.
140. Caminker, supra note 4, at 542.
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legislative and judicial branches, should Congress be tempted to cross
the line and encroach on norms of judicial independence and the rule of
law. 141 This is formalism, but perhaps a good kind of formalism,
preserving the realm in which judiciary exercises its prerogatives. 142
Nevertheless, as Caminker acknowledges, his point is limited by
repeated judicial rejections of Klein arguments and the often-extreme
judicial efforts to avoid Klein problems. 143
If the prohibition on dictating outcomes is a rigid one that cannot be
drafted around, Klein itself was correct. Perhaps it is only the
subsequent softening of the rule—by recognizing an ethereal line
between amending substantive law and dictating outcomes—that gets it
wrong. 144 Thus Robertson, with a statute imposing a blanket alteration
of five different environmental statutes affecting the outcome of two
specifically identified cases about the spotted owl habitat, was a
categorical violation of Klein. 145 The same is true of Save Our Mall,
where Congress similarly undermined specific litigation affecting the
Memorial with a blanket amendment of all potentially applicable law.146
This broad reading of the prohibition on dictating outcomes justifies
Klein’s mythic, cult-like status—it is a precedent that should and would
possess significant force but for its subsequent watering-down. 147
But it also dramatically narrows Congress’ power ever to amend
substantive law. It calls Wheeling Bridge—the precedent the Klein
Court expressly reaffirmed and distinguished—into question because
Congress similarly altered the applicable legal rule to be applied to an
ongoing prospective remedy. 148 And it calls into question Congress’
recognized power to make new law applicable to pending cases.149
Martin Redish and Christopher Pudelski offer another way around the
nothing-but-a-drafting-rule problem. They argue that Klein prohibits
141. Id.
142. See Araiza, supra note 14, at 1090, 1134; Caminker, supra note 4, at 542.
143. Caminker, supra note 4, at 542. See supra notes 92–115 and accompanying text.
144. See Araiza, supra note 14, at 1089.
145. See id. at 1059 (“[I]t is hard to avoid the feeling that there is something inappropriately nonlegislative about this statute.”); Redish & Pudelski, supra note 4, at 455 (arguing that Robertson shows
the Court playing “fast and loose” with this principle); Sager, supra note 4, at 2527; supra notes 101–
110, 121 and accompanying text.
146. See Nat’l Coal. to Save Our Mall v. Norton, 269 F.3d 1092, 1096–97 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
147. Cf. Bloom, Unconstitutional Courses, supra note 14, at 1720–21 (“Klein is far from
jurisprudentially trivial, even if the facts seem historically quaint.”); Meltzer, supra note 14, at 2549
(“Klein should not be discarded as a badly-reasoned relic with no contemporary significance.”).
148. See United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 146–47 (1871); Redish & Pudelski, supra
note 4, at 446–47; supra notes 74–79, 90–98, and accompanying text.
149. See supra notes 92–98 and accompanying text. But see Araiza, supra note 14, at 1130;
Young, supra note 4, at 1248–49.
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Congress from deceiving the public about the true state of substantive
law. 150 The problem with the 1870 proviso was that it left the 1863 Act
in full force—all property owners could recover on proof of ownership
and loyalty—but altered the evidentiary rules related to pardons to
prevent a class of owners from recovering under the 1863 Act. 151
Congress deceived the public about the true state of the law by
manipulating evidentiary and procedural rules; while substantive law
appeared to the public to go one way, procedural law commanded
different results in the case at hand. 152
This focus on deception resolves the statute-of-limitations
hypothetical previously offered. If Congress must be clear, open, and
honest to the public about the state of substantive law, it must make
clear that the limitations period has been eliminated as an applicable
defense in all cases. It would impermissibly deceive the public for
Congress to appear to leave the defense in place but compel courts to
reject the defense in every case. The no-deception principle functions as
an interpretive guide for statutes that authorize claims “notwithstanding”
or “without regard to” some other statute or legal rule, compelling the
conclusion that Congress replaced prior law with a new rule of decision
rather than dictating an outcome.
Finally, consider the possibility that Klein was wrong—the Court
misapplied the no-dictating-outcomes principle and the result in Klein
was entirely a product of poor legislative drafting. The 1870 proviso
arguably did not dictate outcomes beyond what legislation normally
does. Congress did not declare that the United States must prevail in
these cases, nor did it tell courts to decide that Wilson or any claimant
had or had not been loyal, in fact or in law. Congress simply changed
the legal effect of a pardon for all cases going forward—an uncontested
pardon could not establish loyalty. 153 Courts retained independent
judgment to resolve these cases, guided by the amended law. 154 It
remained with the court to examine the claimant’s pardon and decide
whether he properly contested the recitation of crimes, whether he had
been loyal in law or fact, and whether he was entitled to proceeds under
that new law.
Senator Drake’s original proposal required the Supreme Court to
“reverse” any Court of Claims judgment based on a pardon and,
150. See Redish & Pudelski, supra note 4, at 440.
151. Id. at 447, 461.
152. Id. at 450–51.
153. Id. at 445.
154. To the extent the law amended was the constitutional law of pardons, that raises a distinct
Klein problem, discussed infra Part III.B.
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presumably, remand to the Court of Claims for a new determination
under the amended law. 155 One might argue that this “dictates” an
outcome on appeal—the Supreme Court must reverse if an uncontested
pardon had been relied on below. But again, the Court retained an
independent role. It would decide whether the pardon had been relied
on below and whether that pardon had been contested; Congress merely
established the consequence of that finding. And this brings us back to
inherent formalism. Congress could have achieved its preferred result
simply by imposing the ordinary rule that the appellate court applies the
law as of the time of the appeal. The Supreme Court thus would have
recognized that the Court of Claims judgment based on an uncontested
pardon could not stand under the amended law; the judgment would
have been reversed even without a legislative command.
B. Speaking Untruths and Dictating Meaning
The second express holding in Klein was that the proviso had the
effect of impairing a presidential pardon, thereby infringing on the
constitutional authority of the President by making acceptance of an
uncontested pardon per se proof of disloyalty. 156 And by requiring
courts to give the pardon the congressionally determined effect,
Congress directed the court to be an instrument of that impairment. 157
Congress overstepped its constitutional authority viz a viz the judiciary
by attempting to dictate to the judiciary the scope and meaning of the
constitutional presidential pardon power and the effects of the exercise
of that power. That restraint on congressional control over judicial
constitutional analysis need not and should not be limited only to the
pardon power and not other parts of the Constitution.158
Sager labels this Klein’s true first principle:
The judiciary will not allow itself to be made to speak and act against its
own best judgment on matters within its competence which have great
consequence for our political community. The judiciary will not permit
its articulate authority to be subverted to serve ends antagonistic to its
actual judgment; the judiciary will resist efforts to make it seem to
support and regularize that with which it in fact disagrees. 159

155. See Tyler, supra note 7, at 95–96; Young, supra note 4, at 1204–05, 1210; supra notes 61–65
and accompanying text.
156. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 147–48 (1871). See Meltzer, supra note 14,
at 2538–39, 2549; Sager, supra note 4, at 2531.
157. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 148; Sager, supra note 4, at 2531.
158. Tyler, supra note 7, at 107.
159. Sager, supra note 4, at 2529.
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Put succinctly, Congress may not compel courts to speak a
“constitutional untruth.” 160
There are two ways to understand this idea. A broader, judicialsupremacy-centered take is that courts, not Congress, determine
constitutional meaning.
Klein then becomes unexceptional, a
straightforward assertion that it is not for the majoritarian legislature to
declare the meaning of the counter-majoritarian Constitution. 161 A
narrower, departmentalist take is that while Congress can interpret the
Constitution, 162 it cannot insist that the judiciary adopt the congressional
interpretation as its own and it cannot compel the judiciary to apply that
interpretation within the adjudicative process. 163 Either leads to the
same point: the Constitution is violated by a statute that “will implicate
the judiciary in misrepresentation of matters of constitutional
substance.” 164
Whether this is Klein’s true first principle, it may be its most
enduring. It converges somewhat with the prohibition on Congress
predetermining rules and case outcomes, as both demand an unimpeded
realm for independent judicial analysis and best judgment. 165 But courts
and Congress both can interpret around the latter limits by drafting and
interpreting legislation as a permissible amendment to substantive
law. 166 By contrast, courts cannot read around this principle where
Congress and the courts disagree on constitutional meaning. If a law
redefines a constitutional provision and commands courts to apply that
160. Meltzer, supra note 14, at 2545. See Bloom, Unconstitutional Courses, supra note 14, at
1721–22 (arguing that Klein means courts should not be forced to reach or validate incorrect or
unconstitutional outcomes); Tyler, supra note 7, at 109 (“Congress may not compel the courts to enforce
an unconstitutional law . . . .”).
161. Redish & Pudelski, supra note 4, at 443; Keith E. Whittington, Extrajdudicial Constitutional
Interpretation: Three Objections and Responses, 80 N.C. L. REV. 773, 774 (2002). See Edward A.
Hartnett, Modest Hope for a Modest Roberts Court: Deference, Facial Challenges, and the Comparative
Competence of Courts, 59 SMU L. REV. 1735, 1737 (2006) (“The central question in constitutional
adjudication is the degree of deference, if any, that courts give to constitutional interpretation by other
governmental actors.”); Whittington, supra, at 778 (“[T]he debate over judicial supremacy focuses more
squarely on . . . who should make the final decision concerning contested [constitutional]
interpretations.”). See also City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 529 (1997).
162. See Gary Lawson & Christopher D. Moore, The Executive Power of Constitutional
Interpretation, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1267, 1269–70 (1996); Paulsen, Myth, supra note 2, at 2709;
Whittington, supra note 161, at 781.
163. Sager, supra note 4, at 2533.
164. Id. See Bloom, Unconstitutional Courses, supra note 14, at 1721–22; Tyler, supra note 7, at
109.
165. See Bloom, Unconstitutional Courses, supra note 14, at 1721 (arguing that Klein prevents
Congress from threatening courts’ autonomy and power to decide cases independently, finally, and
effectively); supra Part III.A.
166. See Araiza, supra note 14, at 1133; Caminker, supra note 4, at 542; Sager, supra note 4, at
2534; supra notes 92–98, 133–155 and accompanying text.
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definition despite judicial disagreement, Klein requires that courts
exercise their best judgment as to the Constitution, necessarily
disregarding any statute compelling the contrary.
But while enduring, the principle as stated may be of relatively
limited application. Congress does not often enact statutes expressly
redefining or reinterpreting the Constitution or telling courts what the
Constitution means. To be sure, this principle unquestionably was
violated in Klein itself—the 1870 proviso stripped an uncontested
presidential pardon of any effect and dictated that point to the courts.
But it is difficult to find examples of Congress enacting a law that tells
courts “the First Amendment shall mean X” or “the Equal Protection
Clause is violated by Y.”
Sager argues that a present-day Congress violated this principle with
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), 167 which sought to
override by statute a judicial interpretation of the First Amendment’s
Free Exercise Clause. In Employment Division v. Smith, 168 the Court
held that the Free Exercise Clause is not violated by a neutral law of
general applicability that incidentally regulates religiously motivated
conduct in the same way it regulates identical conduct committed for
non-religious reasons. 169 The Court rejected the argument that laws
incidentally infringing on religiously motivated conduct should be
subject to strict scrutiny, 170 which would have forbidden incidental
regulation of religiously motivated conduct unless the regulation was the
least restrictive means to serve a compelling government interest. 171
RFRA was an express congressional reaction to Smith. 172 It provided
that any state or federal law that “substantially burdened” religious
activity, even incidentally, must satisfy strict scrutiny as the least
restrictive means to serve a compelling interest. 173 Congress made
unquestionably clear that it believed Smith had been wrong and that it
was seeking to legislatively undo that constitutional decision.
Sager insists this violates Klein. In applying RFRA, courts would
conduct a familiar constitutional analysis—determining whether a
plaintiff’s religiously motivated conduct was substantially burdened,
then applying “exquisitely constitutional” compelling-interest
167. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–2000bb-4 (2006).
168. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
169. Id. at 878–79. See also Sager, supra note 4, at 2532.
170. Smith, 494 U.S. at 882–84. This contrasts with laws that only target religiously motivated
conduct. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531–32 (1993).
171. Smith, 494 U.S. at 885–88.
172. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a), (b) (2006).
173. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a), (b) (2006); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 513 (1997);
Sager, supra note 4, at 2532.
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analysis. 174 But this is not the analysis a court, left to its independent
First Amendment judgment and following Smith, would have applied;
the statute compelled the court to speak an untruth as to the appropriate
constitutional standard for evaluating the religion-burdening law. 175
And it likely pushed courts to different outcomes because strict scrutiny
obviously invalidates many laws that survive less rigorous review.
RFRA should not be invalid under the no-constitutional-untruths
principle, however. The statute did not tell courts what the First
Amendment means or how it should apply; it did not say “X violates the
First Amendment” or “the First Amendment shall mean X.” Instead,
RFRA created a new, distinct statutory right to be asserted in lieu of or
supplemental to a First Amendment claim that would be governed by
Smith. 176
Congress frequently legislates against a constitutional
background, creating statutory rights and duties different from existing
constitutional rights and duties, intended to be either complementary or
exclusive of constitutional rights regarding the same conduct. 177 True,
RFRA adopted a now-defunct constitutional standard that the Court did
not view as the best understanding of the First Amendment. 178 But, as
Daniel Meltzer correctly argues, any statutory rule of decision must
come from somewhere and it arguably is better for Congress to borrow
an outdated constitutional standard than to blindly use whatever standard
lobbyists create. 179 Congress may adopt a statutory standard different
than the constitutional standard so long as the underlying rule is within
Congress’ legislative power. 180
Whatever the merits of noconstitutional-untruths as Klein’s first principle, RFRA did not compel
courts to support and regularize a constitutional standard that ran against
their independent judgment as to proper resolution of a claim for relief
under the Constitution itself; it only required courts to apply a statutory
standard that was different than the controlling constitutional standard.
Whatever the validity of RFRA as a matter of congressional power, that
constitutional issue has nothing to do with Klein. 181
174. Sager, supra note 4, at 2532.
175. Id. at 2533. See also Tyler, supra note 7, at 109.
176. Meltzer, supra note 14, at 2545.
177. Id. at 2545–46. See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 129 S. Ct. 788, 794 (2009).
178. Meltzer, supra note 14, at 2543–44.
179. Id. at 2544.
180. Id. at 2546.
181. In City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), the Court unanimously struck down RFRA
as to a local ordinance, although for a non-Klein reason. The Court held that RFRA exceeded Congress’
power under § 5 to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, including incorporated Bill of Rights provisions.
Id. at 536. The power to “enforce” meant Congress only could create statutory rights that were
“congruent and proportional” to rights established under the Constitution, with the Court wielding sole
power to determine the scope of the Constitution. Id. at 530–31. See also Sager, supra note 4, at 2532.
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So what might violate the no-constitutional-untruths principle, if not
RFRA? Consider recently threatened, but never enacted, legislation
prohibiting federal courts from using foreign or international law in
interpreting and applying the Constitution. 182 Such a prohibition
operates one step removed from Sager’s core principle—rather than
dictating the appropriate constitutional standard, Congress dictates the
legal sources and ideas that courts use in identifying, defining, and
applying the appropriate constitutional standard. But the effect is the
same. By limiting the sources to which courts might turn in elucidating
constitutional ideas and meaning—sources to which judges might be
inclined to turn if left to their best independent constitutional
judgment—the prohibition necessarily compels courts to understand the
Constitution in a way different than the judge deems appropriate and to
announce that different understanding as a constitutional rule.
But we should not read this one example as indicating real practical
vigor. Congress never has come close to enacting this or any similar
bill, so the force of this “first principle” of Klein remains hypothetical.
In fact, enactment is highly unlikely, given that the strongest judicial
opponent of the use of foreign and international law in U.S.
constitutional interpretation is also the strongest judicial proponent of
the Klein argument against such efforts: Justice Scalia. Scalia has
criticized the practice of using foreign law in several dissents183 and in

RFRA’s statutory rule of strict scrutiny went too far beyond Smith’s constitutional rule of, essentially,
rational basis review. Flores, 521 U.S. at 531.
On first glance, this looks similar to Sager’s no-constitutional-untruth principle, and Amanda
Tyler argues that the analysis in Boerne “echoed” Klein. Tyler, supra note 7, at 107. But Klein and
Boerne target different concerns. Boerne does not suggest that any statutory right utilizing a standard
different than the current constitutional rule is always invalid. The problem with RFRA arose from
unique limits on the scope of statutory rights that Congress can create acting under § 5 as a particular
power grant. But acting under a different, less-limited source of prescriptive jurisdiction, Congress
remains free to adopt different statutory standards—even standards the courts have rejected for
constitutional rules. For example, lower courts have upheld RFRA as a valid limitation on otherwiseneutral federal enactments, enacted under Congress’ Article I powers rather than under § 5, that
substantially burden religion. See, e.g., Kaemmerling v. Lappin, 553 F.3d 669, 677–78 (D.C. Cir. 2008)
(stating that RFRA offers protection from religion-neutral federal laws); In re Young, 141 F.3d 854,
860–61 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding that RFRA is constitutional as applied to federal bankruptcy law).
182. See, e.g., Constitution Restoration Act of 2005, S. 520, 109th Cong. § 201 (as introduced in
the Senate). The proposal was motivated by several decisions in which the Court looked to principles of
international law and the law of other nations in defining constitutional meaning. See, e.g., Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575–76 (2005) (death penalty for juveniles); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558,
560 (2003) (criminalization of same-sex sodomy); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002)
(citing to foreign nations views of executing mentally handicapped).
183. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 624 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]he basic premise of the Court’s
argument—that American law should conform to the laws of the rest of the world—ought to be rejected
out of hand.”); Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (labeling citation to foreign law
“dangerous dicta”).
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public debates with Justice Breyer. 184 But Scalia insists that the sources
of law that federal judges use in making constitutional decisions are
none of Congress’ business: “No one is more opposed to the use of
foreign law than I am, but I’m darned if I think it’s up to Congress to
direct the court how to make its decisions.” 185 This is a Klein nountruths argument. And it seems unlikely that even a strongly
Republican Congress would enact that prohibition in the face of vocal
objections from a well-regarded conservative Justice.
The no-untruths principle also creates gaps between constitutional
rules and sub-constitutional rules. 186 It limits congressional power to
define for courts the meaning and interpretation of constitutional
provisions and it prohibits congressional efforts to limit courts’
interpretive authority on matters of “constitutional substance.” 187
Congress cannot tell courts what the pardon power means or what the
Free Exercise Clause means, nor can Congress dictate the appropriate
standard of review or methods and sources of constitutional analysis.
Congress, however, remains master of the meaning of statutes and
statutory legal rules. 188 There is no such thing as Congress compelling a
court to speak a “statutory untruth”—no such thing as limiting or
controlling judicial interpretive authority or independent judgment on
matters of statutory substance. The “truth” of the statutory rule, and
what the court always is bound to wield its independent judgment to find
and apply, is whatever Congress deems the truth.
Congress wields potentially broad discretion in determining statutory
truth. 189 Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz argues that Congress can define
and dictate to courts everything about statutory meaning, including how
184. See Antonin Scalia & Stephen Breyer, Debate, Constitutional Relevance of Foreign Court
Decisions (Jan. 13. 2005), available at http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/1352357/posts.
185. Charles Lane, Scalia Tells Congress to Mind its Own Business, WASH. POST, Mar. 19, 2006,
available
at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/05/18/
AR2006051801961.html.
186. See Meltzer, supra note 14, at 2549 (emphasizing the “importance and transparency of a
formal distinction between statutory prescription and purported constitutional revision”); Redish, supra
note 118, at 715 (arguing that the purported limits on congressional authority fall away with respect to
congressional control over sub-constitutional rules).
187. Sager, supra note 4, at 2533.
188. Brudney, supra note 132, at 33–34; Howard M. Wasserman, Jurisdiction, Merits, and NonExtant Rights, 56 U. KAN. L. REV. 227, 243, 270 (2008); Widiss, supra note 130, at 518. See W. Va.
Univ. Hosps. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 115 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“In the domain of statutory
interpretation, Congress is the master.”), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No.
102-166, § 113, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2006)).
189. Tyler, supra note 7, at 106. See Einer Elhauge, Preference-Estimating Statutory Default
Rules, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 2027, 2041 (2002) (“[T]he whole reason for having a political process for
enacting statutes is to determine what the ‘right’ thing is by assuring that, within constitutional bounds,
political preferences are reflected in statutory results.”).
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a statute should be understood and how it should be applied in reaching
decisions; this includes definitions of terms, 190 legal standards,
interpretive instructions, interpretive and constructive rules, permissible
sources of legislative history and interpretive guidance, and even
interpretive methodology. 191 Courts in statutory cases are bound to
respect Congress’ lawmaking supremacy, regardless of how Congress
chooses to exercise and express that authority. 192 On this view,
Congress could prevent courts from looking to foreign and international
law as guides in interpreting a statutory rule.
Bill Araiza and Linda Jellum both agree that Congress can establish
statutory rules, standards, and even definitions. 193 But both distinguish
drafting statutes from interpreting statutes, arguing that Congress crosses
a separation of powers barrier when it ventures into the latter by
commanding courts how to interpret the language that Congress has
written and defined. 194 Both commentators presumably would reject a
rule prohibiting courts from using foreign and international law in
interpreting federal statutes.
But it is not clear what is sacred about statutory interpretation, as
opposed to statutory drafting. Both are “inescapably a kind of
legislation,” ways to identify statutory rules of decision. 195
Identification, elaboration, and construction of those rules is a joint
venture between Congress and the courts. Congress has final say as to
the best way to express the meaning of the legal rule it creates in the
legislation itself. Sometimes specific definitions of each term and
provision will be possible. 196 Other times, given the inherent limits of
language, Congress may find it more effective or feasible to write in
broad strokes and dictate the manner in which courts interpret and
understand those strokes, such as rules about interpretive methodology
or permissible sources of authority, a more flexible, open-ended way to
create statutory rules as part of a broader, cohesive, coherent statutory

190. Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV. L. REV.
2085, 2127 (2002).
191. Id. at 2108, 2140, 2152. See Elhauge, supra note 189, at 2040–41 (“[T]he legislature can
also try to reestablish the supremacy of democratic choice by enacting statutes that specify statutory
default rules that maximize political satisfaction.”).
192. Brudney, supra note 132, at 23.
193. See Araiza, supra note 14, at 1131; Linda D. Jellum, “Which is to Be the Master,” the
Judiciary or the Legislature? When Statutory Directives Violate Separation of Powers, 56 UCLA L.
REV. 837, 880, 882 (2009); see also Rosenkranz, supra note 190, at 2127 (“[D]efining terms is, in the
first instance, an inherent incident of the legislative power.”).
194. Araiza, supra note 14, at 1120, 1127; Jellum, supra note 193, at 882–83.
195. Widiss, supra note 130, at 519.
196. See Rosenkranz, supra note 190, at 2142; see also Brudney, supra note 132, at 23.
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regime. 197
Moreover, Congress unquestionably can trump judicial interpretations
of statutes through overriding legislation—new or amended statutes
superseding judicial interpretations of statutory language where the
legislature disagrees with the judiciary’s understanding. 198 There is no
reason Congress cannot statutorily direct courts as to the proper
interpretation of its legal rules in the original statute, rather than waiting
for courts to get it wrong (in Congress’ view) and having to go back and
enact new legislation to correct that erroneous interpretation. 199
What is uniquely judicial is not interpretation but application. Courts
alone wield power to take a statutory rule as written and interpreted by
all possible interpreters and apply it to a particular set of facts and
circumstances to resolve a specific dispute between specific parties.
Within constitutional bounds, Congress has free reign to define those
sub-constitutional legal rules, including the means of identifying them.
What Congress cannot dictate is the application of those subconstitutional legal rules to those particular facts or the outcome of the
case on those facts; that must remain within the courts’ independent
judgment.
But this simply collapses the no-untruths principle into the earlier
Klein prohibition on legislative dictation of case outcomes, at least
where statutory or sub-constitutional rules are concerned. 200 Congress
retains power and discretion to establish the statutory rule and the
methods for divining that rule. Courts merely must have free reign to
apply the rule and resolve the legal and factual dispute as to the parties
before them.
C. Dictating Unconstitutional Rules of Decision
Edward Hartnett suggests a very different, but arguably more straight197. Rosenkranz, supra note 190, at 2143 (arguing that congressionally adopted interpretive rules
could form a true interpretive regime, a set of background principles with internal coherence).
198. See John A. Ferejohn & Larry D. Kramer, Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary:
Institutionalizing Judicial Restraint, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 1020 (2002); Widiss, supra note 130, at
520.
199. Recognizing broad legislative freedom to control all manner of statutory interpretation at the
outset avoids three problems in the statutory creation and interpretation dance between legislature and
judiciary. The first problem is figuring out when an amendment is an improper interpretation. See
Araiza, supra note 14, at 1127. Second, courts often continue to follow statutory precedent even in the
face of new, overriding legislation. See Widiss, supra note 130, at 515. Finally, Congress does not and
realistically cannot review most of the body of statutory decisions or take steps to override those with
which its current members disagree. See Ferejohn & Kramer, supra note 198, at 974 n.25; Amanda L.
Tyler, Continuity, Coherence, and the Canons, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1389, 1409–10 (2005).
200. See supra Part III.A.
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forward, constitutional principle that emerges from the overall context of
Klein, if not from the convoluted language of the opinion itself.
According to Hartnett, it is not that Congress lacks authority to prescribe
rules of decision, 201 only that Congress lacks authority to prescribe
“arbitrary” rules of decision. 202 In other words, Congress cannot
prescribe unconstitutional rules of decision—rules that violate
constitutional rights. The problem with the 1870 proviso, at least as
applied in Klein, was that Wilson had received and accepted his pardon;
certain rights vested the moment he received it and he could not be
stripped of those rights. 203
On this view, neither of the explicit independent holdings in Klein or
the principles derived from them are truly central. For example, a law
establishing a new rule of decision applicable to a pending case would
not have raised constitutional problems so long as it did not strip vested
constitutional rights. Hartnett imagines that congressional preferences
in 1870 ran the other way—that while Klein was pending on appeal,
Congress enacted a statute overturning the Padelford rule that serving as
a Confederate surety was an act of disloyalty, such that all those who
had acted as sureties could recover proceeds under the 1863 Act.204
Wilson’s estate would have been entitled to recover proceeds, regardless
of the content or status of the pardon, because Wilson must be found
loyal-in-fact as he never gave aid and comfort. Such a law would have
established a rule of decision in a pending cause, but it would not strip
any individual vested constitutional rights, making it likely to survive
constitutional scrutiny.
Klein becomes not about a pending/non-pending distinction, but about
altering the effect of the pardon after the pardon had been accepted and
the rights vested. The 1870 proviso would have been invalid even in
cases brought after its enactment; regardless of timing, it still would
have made acceptance of the pardon proof of guilt, undoing the pardon’s
effect and stripping vested rights emanating from it. Klein becomes not
a separation of powers case, but an individual rights case. And it
becomes more than a pardon case. 205 That Wilson’s vested rights came
from a pardon was mere fortuity; the outcome would be the same if a
201. Hartnett, supra note 4, at 578; supra notes 69–73, 85–98 and accompanying text.
202. Hartnett, supra note 4, at 579; United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 146 (1871).
203. Hartnett argues that the concept of vested rights was a dominant feature of 19th century
general constitutional law, which recognized limits on any laws or legal rules that stripped rights once
they had vested with the rights-holder. Under then-existing constitutional understandings, vested rights
became constitutionally protected against congressional infringement. Hartnett, supra note 4, at 579–80.
204. Id. at 579.
205. Tyler, supra note 7, at 107 (arguing that it is a mistake to under-read Klein as speaking
exclusively to the pardon power).
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law interfered with any vested rights emanating from any constitutional
source.
But this reading nevertheless renders Klein unexceptional and
undeserving of its cult status. For one thing, the concept of vested rights
no longer forms a prominent part of modern constitutional analysis,
leaving the case without much current force. For another, to the extent
Klein becomes about basic constitutionalism, it is well-established that
the Constitution imposes internal and external limits on the statutory
rules Congress can enact. It is well-established that courts cannot
enforce statutes that exceed Congress’ power. 206 It is also wellestablished that a legal rule that infringes on constitutional rights does
not exist as enforceable law; the rights such a rule creates and duties it
imposes do not exist and cannot be enforced or vindicated. 207 Klein
does no more than Marbury and dozens of cases in which the Court has
struck down substantive federal statutory law as violating individual
constitutional rights. 208 We do not need Klein and it adds nothing
meaningful to the judicial canon.
D. Concluding Thoughts
This Part reveals the full folly of the connected myths of Klein. Klein
has core meanings. Congress cannot tell courts how to decide particular
legal and factual issues or the outcome to reach in specific litigation.
Congress cannot tell courts how to understand, interpret, and apply the
Constitution or compel them to pronounce a “constitutional untruth,” a
constitutional view with which the court disagrees. And Congress
cannot enact a law that violates individual rights.
But, as shown, none of these principles is groundbreaking or
exceptional. Nor do any carry significant doctrinal force. Congress
never has enacted, nor is it likely to enact, laws that genuinely violate
these principles. Klein’s myth in the first sense of falsehood is exposed.
Its myth in the second sense, of a culturally beneficial falsehood,
becomes both unwarranted and unnecessary.

206. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); Tyler, supra note 7, at 109
(“Congress may not compel the courts to enforce an unconstitutional law.”).
207. See Matthew D. Adler & Michael C. Dorf, Consitutional Existence Conditions and Judicial
Review, 89 VA. L. REV. 1105, 1120, 1155 (2003); Wasserman, supra note 188, at 253–54.
208. See, e.g., Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 527 (2001); Dickerson v. United States, 530
U.S. 428 (2000); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S.
200 (1995).
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IV. THE PATHOLOGY OF KLEIN AND THE MEANING OF MYTH
Constitutionalism, Vincent Blasi argues, “derives from a view
regarding the various objectives that are served by constraining
representative institutions by means of the device of constitutional
limitations.” 209 Constitutionalism depends “on the existence of a
considerable measure of continuity and stability regarding the most
basic structural arrangements and value commitments of the
constitutional regime.” 210 Constitutionalism is essential in what Blasi
calls a pathological period, one reflecting “an unusually serious
challenge to one or more of the central norms of the constitutional
regime.” 211 Such a period is marked by a “sense of urgency stemming
from societal disorientation if not panic.” 212 Its defining feature is “a
shift in basic attitudes, among certain influential actors if not the public
at large,” about central constitutional commitments. 213 That panic
affects structural features and arrangements, such as formal and informal
separation of powers and checks and balances. 214 Constitutionalism and
judicial review exist precisely to respond to and enable the system to
survive these pathological periods. 215
Reconstruction qualifies as a pathological period under Blasi’s
conception, particularly the politically tumultuous period from 1869 to
1871 that produced Padelford, the proviso, and Klein. The Thirteenth
and Fourteenth Amendments had been enacted, but their effect on
congressional power and on federal–state balance remained unclear. 216
Tensions between Congress and President Andrew Johnson began as
early as 1867 and bubbled over into Johnson’s 1868 impeachment and
near-removal from office. 217 In the meantime, Congress had statutorily
removed the invitation (or authorization) for presidential pardon in
confiscated-property cases. 218 Padelford had outraged congressional
Republicans, who believed the decision interfered with efforts to punish
the cotton growers who had been essential in funding the Confederate
209. Blasi, supra note 27, at 453.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 456, 459 (“In pathological periods, at least some of the central norms of the
constitutional regime are indeed scrutinized and challenged.”).
212. Id. at 468.
213. Id. at 467.
214. Id. at 468.
215. Id. at 453; see supra note 30.
216. See ACKERMAN, VOL. 2, supra note 55, at 100–19; 122–24; FONER, supra note 55, at 257–
58; Edwards, supra note 55, at 327–28.
217. See ACKERMAN, VOL. 2, supra note 55, at 18–20; FONER, supra note 55, at 333–35;
Edwards, supra note 55, at 329–30.
218. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 141–42 (1871); Tyler, supra note 7, at 90.
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war effort. 219 Efforts to undo Padelford, and with it the then-pending
Court of Claims decision in Klein, were part of a broader three-way
federal-government power struggle as to the direction of the postbellum
nation, particularly on matters of national power and the reintegration of
southern states and citizenry into the Union. 220 In that sense, Padelford
and Klein are two of a series of judicial decisions rejecting, narrowing,
or otherwise interfering with the Republicans’ Reconstruction agenda. 221
Blasi’s theory is that rigorous constitutional judicial review should be
reserved for the “worst of times,” those periods of “increased urgency”
when traditional checks on the political branches and the public have
been rendered ineffective to restrain political officials and citizens,
leaving the Constitution as the only bulwark against overreaching
officials and citizens. 222 To the extent Reconstruction was a period of
Congress overstepping its constitutional bounds, the Klein Court did
precisely what Blasi’s constitutionalism expects the judiciary to do—it
invalidated the law because it recognized the need for judicial action in
these worst of times and in light of “the reduced effectiveness of
traditional checks.” 223 The Court responded to the unique circumstances
of Reconstruction and a visceral sense that Congress was “cooking” the
law to achieve its desired result in a time of uniquely sharp three-way
inter-branch conflict. 224 But the Court did so with a judicial doctrine
intended and designed for the worst of times, not for ordinary times.
This perspective ties Klein to its historical context. 225 Certainly we
have encountered subsequent pathological periods in which “central
norms of the constitutional regime” have been “scrutinized and
challenged” to the same extent as during Reconstruction. 226 And
certainly Congress and the President have overstepped constitutional
bounds—including bounds of separation of powers—since then. 227
219. See supra notes 53–58 and accompanying text.
220. See ACKERMAN, VOL. 2, supra note 55, at 123, 199–200, 209; FONER, supra note 55, at 183–
84, 237–38, 250–51; Edwards, supra note 55, at 327–29.
221. See ACKERMAN, VOL. 1, supra note 56, at 101; FONER, supra note 55, at 529; Edwards,
supra note 55, at 335; see also Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872); Blyew v. United
States, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 581 (1872).
222. Blasi, supra note 27, at 453, 468.
223. Of course, it arguably was for one of the rare times in history. See generally Gerald N.
Rosenberg, Judicial Independence and the Reality of Political Power, 54 REV. POL. 369, 378–79, 383–
86 (1992).
224. See Bloom, Unconstitutional Courses, supra note 14, at 1720 (“Klein may now seem almost
trifling, a relic of zealous postbellum politicking.”).
225. See id.; Meltzer, supra note 14, at 2549.
226. See Blasi, supra note 27, at 459.
227. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952); see also Rosenberg, supra note 223, at 379 tbl.I (noting multiple periods
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Perhaps this demonstrates the myth of Klein’s vigor—Klein simply is
not strong enough as a judicially enforceable constitutional doctrine to
invalidate even genuinely pathological legislation. Thus courts have not
seen an opportunity to wield it.
Alternatively, the problem may not be Klein itself, but the subsequent
watering down of Klein in modern cases, where courts have backed off
the strict prohibition on Congress prescribing rules of decision in favor
of recognizing the need for Congress to create and amend the
substantive statutory legal landscape. 228 The idea of “dilution” of
constitutional principles is important to the pathological perspective on
Klein. Blasi specifically warns against overuse of constitutional rules in
normal times, fearing that regular use dilutes constitutional principles
and doctrines, leaving them narrow, weak, and unavailable when truly
pathological legislation arises and the principles are needed. 229 This
might explain Plaut, Robertson, Save Our Mall, and other recent cases
rejecting Klein arguments against fairly ordinary, non-pathological
legislation enacted in fairly normal times. 230 The problem, Blasi might
argue, is that those cases weakened the constitutional rule by rejecting
these challenges, leaving a non-vigorous Klein that will be less available
if a genuinely pathological period returns to produce genuinely
pathological legislation.
At the same time, recent history shows that the extreme laws that
would violate Klein—“in A v. B pending in the District Court, B shall
prevail,” “the federal courts shall understand the First Amendment to
mean X,” 231 or “federal courts may not consider or cite foreign and
international law in interpreting the Constitution” 232 —never are or come
close to being enacted.
It is possible (although not provable) that Klein itself deters Congress
from testing the limits of its lawmaking powers, avoiding laws that cross
or draw too close to the line. 233 In other words, Congress, presumed to
know the state of the law, 234 does not go too far because it is aware of
Klein. If so, perhaps we can modify the assertion that Klein does no
of congressional attacks on independence of federal courts).
228. See supra notes 92–98 and accompanying text.
229. Blasi, supra note 27, at 457, 487 (“The strength of the political community’s commitment to
those norms is tested, and it may matter a great deal how well the central norms were nurtured in the
periods of calm that preceded the pathology.”).
230. See supra notes 101–115, 122–125 and accompanying text.
231. As discussed previously, supra notes 167–181 and accompanying text, I do not believe
RFRA dictated to courts the meaning of the First Amendment.
232. See supra note 182–200.
233. Cf. Gunther, supra note 31, at 911; Rosenberg, supra note 223, at 373–74.
234. Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller, 486 U.S. 174, 184–85 (1988).
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meaningful constitutional work to say that, even if it does no meaningful
judicial work in ex post judicial challenges to actual litigation, it does
meaningful ex ante legislative and political work by controlling
Congress’ and the President’s baser instincts and helping avoid the worst
populist excesses. 235 Congress has bought into the myth that Klein
vigorously limits its powers and that myth guides its conduct and
understanding of what it can, should, and will do. And if congressional
belief in the myth of Klein deters potential abuses of legislative power
and checks inter-branch conflict before it occurs, the American politicolegal community is advanced and important politico-legal objectives
achieved—just as all myths form a significant part of our constitutional
identity. 236
This ideal of Klein-in-Congress fits well with a fourth principle
derivable from Klein, proposed by Redish and Pudelski: Congress
cannot cook procedural and evidentiary rules to achieve desired
substantive outcomes without fully changing and publicly
acknowledging the state of substantive law. 237
Representative
democracy obligates elected representatives to make clear policy choices
on behalf of their constituents and prohibits legislators from deceiving
constituents about the true policies they support. Congress cannot play a
“legislative shell game” of purporting to leave substantive law in place,
then eviscerating its legal and practical effect by manipulating
procedural and evidentiary rules to defeat the operation of that law. 238
This is elusive and difficult to apply as judicial principle and it will be
difficult to prove in a given case that the public was in fact deceived as
to the state of the law by a particular enactment. 239 Congress arguably
got away with just such legislative deception in Robertson, when the
Court validated functional congressional alteration of foundational
environmental statutes without expressly and publicly amending
them. 240
Klein thus becomes about congressional self-enforcement.
It
strengthens representative democracy by imposing on Congress and on
individual legislators a constitutional obligation of openness and
235. Blasi, supra note 27, at 453 (“The willingness of those who exercise political power to
recognize superior constitutional authority may derive from perceptions of past commitment,
calculations of reciprocal advantage, or loyalties born of a sense of common endeavor.”). Of course, it
is empirically unprovable to what extent members of Congress or Congress as a whole actively think in
Klein terms when deciding what legislation they can or should enact.
236. See Pettys, supra note 1, at 993; supra notes 19–21 and accompanying text.
237. Supra notes 150–152 and accompanying text.
238. Redish and Pudelski, supra note 4, at 440.
239. Id. at 458–59.
240. Araiza, supra note 14, at 1065–66.
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forthrightness about the state of the law, the legal rules they enact, and
the policies to which they have committed. Even if Klein will not
judicially invalidate whatever laws Congress enacts, it provides political
and prudential reasons for Congress not to exercise the full limits of its
powers, especially when the exercise of power may infringe on the
judicial domain. 241 Congress preemptively avoids potential Klein
controversies by not enacting odd-looking, judiciary-intruding or
judiciary-limiting laws that might draw objections, even if those
objections would prove ultimately meritless in court.
Of course, the essential characteristic of a truly pathological period is
that internal constraints fall away and legislative self-enforcement will
be insufficient, necessitating strong judicial enforcement of meaningful
constitutional limitations. 242
The pathological perspective on Klein is important to understanding
the case’s continued vitality because we arguably find ourselves in a
new pathological period, triggered by the terrorist attacks of September
11 and the subsequent Global War on Terror. The period has been
defined by two foreign wars, ongoing efforts against terrorism, and a
host of controversial domestic and foreign measures by the federal
government, especially the executive, on matters related to terrorism and
national security.
Our current historical period exemplifies Blasi’s conception of a
period of “unusually serious challenge to one or more of the central
norms of the constitutional regime.” 243 We have seen a significant
shock to, and arguably a breakdown of, structural and individual rights
features of the constitutional and political system. 244 President George
241. Michael J. Gerhardt, What’s Old is New Again, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1267, 1280 (2006)
(describing the congressional “constitutional norm against legislation that would directly interfere with
judicial decisions or decision making”); Gunther, supra note 31, at 911 (arguing that the consequences
“have no doubt helped inhibit Congress from resorting” to its full powers); Rosenkranz, supra note 190,
at 2147 (arguing that congressional hesitancy in controlling all aspects of legislative meaning “may stem
from an inchoate concern about separation of powers”). See also Tara Leigh Grove, The Structural
Safeguards of Federal Jurisdiction, 124 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1585973) (arguing that this hesitancy is a result not only of legislative
prudence, but of structural protections built into the Article I lawmaking process that enable minorities
to block legislation that infringes on federal jurisdiction).
242. See Blasi, supra note 27, at 453 (“[U]nless the appeal to constitutionalism evokes genuine
sentiments of long-term commitment or aspiration, officials and citizens cannot be expected to forego
their preferences of the moment in deference to the claims of the constitutional regime.”).
243. Id. at 459.
244. See, e.g., JACK L. GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE
BUSH ADMINISTRATION 114–15 (2007); ERIC LICHTBLAU, BUSH’S LAW: THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN
JUSTICE 4, 137–39 (2008); JANE MAYER, THE DARK SIDE: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW THE WAR ON
TERROR TURNED INTO A WAR ON AMERICAN IDEALS 52 (2008); Paul M. Schwartz, Warrantless
Wiretapping, FISA Reform, and the Lessons of Public Liberty: A Comment on Holmes’s Jorde Lecture,
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W. Bush claimed broad executive powers to act in the interest of
national security, often to the exclusion of Congress and the courts. 245
There has been a renewed three-way dance among the branches to assert
power for themselves and to limit or eliminate the power of the other
branches, particularly the courts. 246 At issue in all of this was the
government’s fundamental approach to an existential crisis and the
balance between security and individual liberty. This dynamic is
remarkably similar to the one during Reconstruction that produced the
1870 proviso and Klein. If there is a pathological historical period likely
to produce genuinely Klein-violative legislation, this is it. And if Klein
is ever to exert meaningful judicial doctrinal force, it would be in these
worst of times.
Yet consider one significant piece of War on Terror legislation—the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Amendments Act of
2008. 247 Sometime after the 9/11 attacks, the Bush Administration
established a classified intelligence-gathering program to wiretap
overseas calls to and from U.S. residents, without a warrant and outside
procedures established in FISA. 248
All but one major
telecommunications company, Qwest, assisted the NSA with the
program. Cooperating companies allowed the government to install
surveillance equipment in their calling stations, agreed to route overseas
calls through domestic switching stations, and helped the NSA pour
through the vast communications flowing between the United States and
countries in the Middle East. 249 After sitting on the story for
approximately a year, The New York Times reported it in late 2005. 250
97 CAL. L. REV. 407, 412–13 (2009); In re Nat’l Sec. Agency Telecomms. Records Litig., 633 F. Supp.
2d 949, 955 (N.D. Cal. 2009); see also Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) (rejecting limitations
on habeas corpus for enemy combatants); Padilla v. Yoo, 633 F. Supp. 2d 1005 (N.D. Cal. 2009)
(permitting claim by detainee against government lawyer who promulgated detention and interrogation
policies leading to alleged constitutional violations).
245. GOLDSMITH, supra note 244, at 124; LICHTBLAU, supra note 244, at 7–9; MAYER, supra note
244, at 49–51; Schwartz, supra note 244, at 423–26. See also GOLDSMITH, supra note 244, at 123
(describing Bush Administration’s “go-it-alone route”).
246. See GOLDSMITH, supra note 244, at 123, 205–07 (discussing consequences of Bush
Administration’s decision to pursue anti-terrorism policies unilaterally); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The
Constitutional Power to Interpret International Law, 118 YALE L.J. 1762, 1839, 1847 (2009) [herinafter
Paulsen, Constitutional Power] (arguing that Congress repudiated the Court’s understanding and
reinstated the executive view); see also Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 636 (2006) (Breyer, J.,
concurring) (arguing that the President must consult with Congress, absent an emergency); Paulsen,
Constitutional Power, supra, at 1835. Compare Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 567 (holding that presidentially
established military commissions for terror suspects violate federal law), with Military Commissions Act
of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600, and Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2240 (2008).
247. Pub. L. No. 110-261, 122 Stat. 2436 (2008) (codified at 50 U.S.C.A. § 1885a (West 2010)).
248. LICHTBLAU, supra note 244, at 9; Schwartz, supra note 244, at 412.
249. LICHTBLAU, supra note 244, at 149–50, 153–54.
250. In re Nat’l Sec. Agency Telecomms. Records Litig., 633 F. Supp. 2d 949, 955 (N.D. Cal.
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President Bush quickly acknowledged the existence of the program and
defended it as necessary for national security and preventing a repeat of
9/11. 251
Lawsuits followed against the NSA and various government agencies
and officials, as well as against the telecom companies. 252 Plaintiffs
alleged the telecoms had conspired with the government to operate a
surveillance program that violated the Fourth Amendment prohibition on
unreasonable searches and seizures and the First Amendment freedom of
speech, as well as various federal statutory provisions. 253
While defending the program, President Bush and administration
officials also argued that warrant requirements and FISA procedures
were outdated and ill-suited to the threats of modern terrorism and that
the wiretap program was necessary to prevent new terrorist attacks. 254
The administration also sought to codify the program already pursued,
broadening executive surveillance powers. 255
As part of that
codification, the Administration sought retroactive immunity for the
telecoms for their role in assisting the NSA. 256 The final measure
included a retroactive grant of immunity to the telecoms from all civil
liability for their conduct in support of any national-security-related
program, 257 along with legislative history showing that Congress
specifically targeted the then-pending lawsuits against the telecoms. 258
Yet in June 2009, the district court handling all the telecom lawsuits
through multi-district litigation 259 upheld § 802 against a variety of
constitutional arguments, including Klein, and dismissed the
constitutional claims against the telecoms. 260
Once more, rigorous judicial enforcement of Klein’s principles is
lacking even in the face of a pathological enactment. 261

2009); LICHTBLAU, supra note 244, at 193–94, 209–11, 212–13; Schwartz, supra note 244, at 413.
251. LICHTBLAU, supra note 244, at 212–13; Schwartz, supra note 244, at 412–13.
252. See In re Nat’l Sec. Agency Telecomms. Records Litig., 633 F. Supp. 2d at 955; Schwartz,
supra note 244, at 413.
253. In re Nat’l Sec. Agency Telecomms. Records Litig., 633 F. Supp. 2d at 955.
254. LICHTBLAU, supra note 244, at 308.
255. Id. at 307–08; Schwartz, supra note 244, at 414–15.
256. Schwartz, supra note 244, at 417.
257. 50 U.S.C. § 1885a (Supp. II 2008); In re Nat’l Sec. Agency Telecomms. Records Litig., 633
F. Supp. 2d at 956; Schwartz, supra note 244, at 417.
258. In re Nat’l Sec. Agency Telecomms. Records Litig., 633 F. Supp. 2d at 959.
259. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2006).
260. See In re Nat’l Sec. Agency Telecomms. Records Litig., 633 F. Supp. 2d at 955. The case is
pending in the Ninth Circuit as of this writing.
261. In the second piece in this series, I argue that the district court’s conclusion as to Klein was
correct. See Wasserman, supra note 13.
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V. CONSTITUTIONALIZING POLICY PREFERENCES
Given Klein’s lack of genuine judicial force, the question remains
why and how the Cult of Klein developed and why it continues. Put
differently, why does Klein remain a myth in the second sense of a legal
narrative, otherwise false, that is fundamental to the self-understanding
and commitments of the politico-legal community?
Ultimately, Klein arguments reduce to an instinctive belief in broad
judicial supremacy and suspicion that Congress overstepped its bounds.
The contours of Klein-centered cases often are quite similar. Congress
appears to have manipulated the rules governing issue in court.
Challenged laws appear to affect the judicial function, threatening the
vaunted, if undefined, judicial independence and rule of law. 262
Congress appears to be “cooking” legal rules to achieve certain
outcomes in identifiable pending or anticipated cases, with laws that
presumably disadvantage plaintiffs, particularly plaintiffs seeking to
vindicate rights against government or against big business. They are
strange-looking laws, politically distasteful to many commentators.
For example, a prohibition on foreign and international law in
constitutional interpretation is viewed as disadvantaging rights claimants
by narrowing the scope of U.S. constitutional rights relative to similar
rights elsewhere, resulting in a clear political or ideological divide
among judges and scholars. 263 That has, in fact, proven true for recent
cases. 264 But it need not be true across the board; for example, using
foreign law might produce much narrower understandings of the First
Amendment freedom of speech, resulting in courts upholding more
legislative limits on expression than without the use of foreign law.
With its broad language, apparent indeterminacy, purportedly empty
core, and historical perception as a separation-of-powers, judicialindependence trump card, Klein has an all-things-to-all-people
quality. 265 If Klein defines a legal-political community and reflects core
constitutional values—if Klein is a myth in the second sense of the
word—it should to do some constitutional heavy lifting and provide a

262. See Caminker, supra note 4, at 542 (grounding strong Klein principle in need to “generate
sufficient norms of independence and, frankly, essentiality, to safeguard long-term fidelity to the rule of
law”). But see Shugerman, supra note 118, at 979 (arguing for narrow understanding of Klein to keep
from “turning it into a Frankenstein of judicial independence”).
263. See Antonin Scalia & Stephen Breyer, Debate, Constitutional Relevance of Foreign Court
Decisions (Jan. 13. 2005), available at http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/1352357/posts.
264. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575–76 (2005) (execution of juveniles);
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 560 (2003) (criminalization of same-sex sodomy); Atkins v. Virginia,
536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002) (execution of mentally handicapped).
265. Young, supra note 4, at 1195.
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doctrinal tool with which courts can push back against Congress. The
twin myths of opacity and vigor together cause commentators and
advocates to assert constitutional defects far more frequently than
Klein’s principles, properly and narrowly understood, would otherwise
suggest. Any unwise, strange-looking, judiciary-affecting law must
violate the Constitution.
Klein thus becomes the ideal vehicle for constitutionalizing those
ordinary policy preferences. But morphing political distaste into
unconstitutionality blurs a central distinction. 266 Conflation of wisdom
and constitutionality is quite common in disputes over the limits of
congressional and executive authority with respect to the judiciary.
Gerald Gunther identified the problem in an earlier academic
controversy over a different judicial-independence fault line:
congressional power to strip federal courts of jurisdiction to hear and
resolve particular classes of constitutional cases. Gunther argued that
jurisdiction-stripping proposals were neither desirable as a matter of
policy nor likely to be effective. 267 But Gunther also rejected most
constitutional arguments against jurisdiction stripping, arguing that they
confused “what the Constitution authorizes” with “sound constitutional
statesmanship.” 268
Much the same is at work with many Klein arguments: the laws at
issue may be unwise, but Klein is not so broad or powerful as precedent
to render unwise laws constitutionally defective. Klein imposes narrow
constitutional limits on Congress; it says nothing about what Congress
should do with its power within those limits. Klein cannot convert
normative policy objections into constitutional defects.
Consider one category of Klein-vulnerable enactment: recent
congressional efforts to override state common law and bar certain
mass-tort claims. In 2005, Congress enacted the Protection of Lawful
Commerce in Arms Act (PLCAA), which prohibited, and required
dismissal of, any “qualified civil liability action,” defined as a pending
or future action against a member of the gun industry for any relief,
including injunctions and nuisance abatement, resulting from criminal or
unlawful misuse of firearms by third persons. 269 The law was a direct
response to several state-law public nuisance actions by states,
municipalities, and individuals against gun manufacturers, gun sellers,
and gun trade associations for failing to limit the movement of firearms
in illegal markets and into the hands of those who use firearms for
266.
267.
268.
269.

Gunther, supra note 31, at 898.
Id. at 898, 921.
Id. at 898.
Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, Pub. L. No. 100-92, 119 Stat. 2095 (2005).
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unlawful purposes. That same year, the House passed the Personal
Responsibility in Food Consumption Act (widely known as the
“Cheeseburger Bill”), a structurally identical piece of legislation that
would have prohibited and required dismissal of several actions by
consumers against the fast-food industry for damages resulting from
obesity, weight gain, and other health problems associated with fast
food. 270
In City of New York v. Beretta, 271 the Second Circuit rejected a broad
constitutional challenge to the PLCAA, including Klein arguments. The
court properly focused on the no-dictating outcomes principle, then
recognized that the PLCAA permissibly amended substantive law—it
established a new federal legal standard to be applied in all defined civil
actions. 272 But Congress did not dictate findings or case outcomes; the
court was left to exercise independent judgment as to whether a
particular claim was a qualified civil action that must be dismissed. And
given the substantive and structural identity between the PLCAA and the
Cheeseburger Bill, the same analysis would have prevailed had the latter
been enacted.
Congress obviously wanted to protect particular industries from civil
litigation and obviously “hoped” that any such actions would be
dismissed, which is why it changed applicable law. But Congress
remains free to amend substantive law in a way likely to produce desired
outcomes, depending on the application of new law to the facts of a
case. Both the PLCAA and the Cheeseburger Bill altered the state of the
law in all defined cases and dictated a new consequence—dismissal of
the action—based on the application of new law to fact. But the
judiciary retained its essential role. It remained for the court to decide,
in the exercise of its independent judgment, whether the particular action
meets the statutory definition making it subject to the affirmative
defense and ripe for dismissal.
David Kairys criticized the PLCAA 273 based on a distrust of
legislatures. Legislatures, he argued, are at the mercy of powerful
litigants who, given the option, ignore the litigation process and send
lobbyists into legislative halls seeking exemption from legal rules that
apply to everyone else and from which the less powerful cannot gain

270. Personal Responsibility in Food Consumption Act of 2005, H.R. 554, 109th Cong. The
Senate never acted on the bill.
271. 524 F.3d 384 (2d Cir. 2008).
272. Id. at 395–96. Because only sub-constitutional law was involved, Congress could not be
understood as having attempted to dictate constitutional meaning or to declare constitutional untruths.
273. Kairys’s criticism would be equally applicable to the Cheeseburger Bill.
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similar immunity. 274 Both laws immunize industry from ordinary state
tort analysis, thus both “undercut coherent and consistent rules and
sacrifice basic fairness for the expediency of the well-connected.” 275 Of
course, in proposing and enacting the PLCAA, Congress expressed its
own distrust—of “maverick” judges and juries sustaining these claims
and expanding civil liability in ways never anticipated by the Framers,
Congress, or state legislatures. 276
But this is not a constitutional argument; it is an argument that
Congress has enacted a scheme that does not produce just legal
outcomes in certain cases. Kairys rejects the congressional goal of
protecting particular industries from civil litigation. He objects to
legislative politics and priorities and the way powerful interests
manipulate legislative and political processes to their benefit. His
argument also is a paean to the judiciary as the great leveler, more
resistant than legislatures to the abuses of powerful interests. It is, in
other words, an objection sounding entirely in political and policy
concerns. The PLCAA establishes (what Kairys views as) sub-optimal
legal rules. So would the Cheeseburger Bill. But there simply is
nothing unconstitutional about legislative politics or about sub-optimal
legal rules.
VI. CONCLUSION
At the end of the day, Klein is a venerable case and an increasingly
common part of the constitutional conversation. But it does little or no
work, certainly not in non-pathological times. However worshipful one
wishes to be of Klein, however much one may want to be part of its cult,
Klein exerts no meaningful doctrinal or jurisprudential force.
Recognizing the twin myths of Klein—that the doctrine is not
meaningless or indeterminate, but also not constitutionally vigorous—
marks a big step toward clearing up much constitutional confusion. That
clarity is necessary as Congress continues to consider and enact Kleinsuspect or Klein-vulnerable laws, so we can recognize that such laws
are, in the end, neither constitutionally suspect nor constitutionally
vulnerable.

274. David Kairys, Legislative Usurpation: The Early Practice and Constitutional Repudiation of
Legislative Intervention in Adjudication, 73 UMKC L. REV. 945, 946 (2005).
275. Id. at 950.
276. 15 U.S.C. § 7901(a)(7).

